2021
DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2103.16405
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The Price of Anarchy is Fragile in Single-Selection Coverage Games

Joshua Seaton,
Philip Brown

Abstract: This paper considers coverage games in which a group of agents are tasked with identifying the highest-value subset of resources; in this context, game-theoretic approaches are known to yield Nash equilibria within a factor of 2 of optimal. We consider the case that some of the agents suffer a communication failure and cannot observe the actions of other agents; in this case, recent work has shown that if there are k > 0 compromised agents, Nash equilibria are only guaranteed to be within a factor of k + 1 of … Show more

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