2006
DOI: 10.1007/11821069_62
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The Price of Defense

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Cited by 14 publications
(30 citation statements)
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“…What if the defender protects some subgraph (rather than a single edge)? Some preliminary steps to such and other extensions already appear in [11,17,18,19].…”
Section: Input: a Bipartite Graph G(v E)mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…What if the defender protects some subgraph (rather than a single edge)? Some preliminary steps to such and other extensions already appear in [11,17,18,19].…”
Section: Input: a Bipartite Graph G(v E)mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…More specifically, there are two classes of confronting randomized players on a graph:  attackers, each choosing vertices and wishing to minimize the probability of being caught, and a single defender, who chooses edges and gains the expected number of attackers it kills. A subsequent work [MMPPS06] introduced the Price of Defense in order to evaluate the loss in the provided security guarantees due to the selfish nature of attacks and defenses. This notion can be also seen as a (negative) measurement of the network security.…”
Section: Wwwintechopencommentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We model both network and security specifications presented in section 3.1.1. using two graph-theoretic games introduced and investigated in [MPPS05c,MPPS05b,MMPPS06]. The game is played on a graph G representing the network N. The players of the game are of two kinds: the attackers players and the defender players, representing the attacks and the security software of the network.…”
Section: Modelling Scenarios Using Security and Network Propertiesmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…The work address the question of whether there are Nash equilibria that both are computationally tractable and offer good price of defense. An extensive collection of trade-offs between price of defense and the computational complexity of Nash equilibria is provided in the work of Mavronicolas et al [64]. Most interestingly, the work of Mavronicolas et al [64,[66][67][68] introduce certain natural classes of Nash equilibria for their network security game on graphs, including matching Nash equilibria [67,68] and perfect matching Nash equilibria [64]; they prove that deciding the existence of equilibria from such classes is precisely equivalent to the recognition problem for König-Egervary graphs [25,54].…”
Section: A Network Security Gamementioning
confidence: 99%