The Pricing of Risk and Sentiment: A Study of Executive Stock Options

Abstract

Option pricing models accounting for illiquidity generally imply the options are valued at a discount to the Black‐Scholes value. Our model considers the role of sentiment, which offsets illiquidity. Using executive stock options and compensation data from 1992 to 2004 for S&P 1500 firms, we find that executives value employee stock options (ESOs) at a 48% premium to the Black‐Scholes value. These premia are explained by a sentiment level of 12% in risk‐adjusted, annualized return, suggesting a high level of executive overconfidence. Subjective value relates negatively to illiquidity and idiosyncratic risk, and positively to sentiment in all specifications, consistent with the offsetting roles of sentiment and risk aversion.

The Price‐taker Effect on the Valuation of Executive Stock Options

“…They find explicit solutions for the optimal effort and volatility but do not take these factors into account in the valuation of stock options. Chang, Chen, and Fuh () look at employee sentiment and find some evidence that because of overconfidence, options are valued higher than previously thought, even to the point of exceeding Black–Scholes–Merton values.…”