2021
DOI: 10.1108/k-07-2020-0476
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The pricing strategy of dual-channel supply chain with risk-averse agents and heterogeneous preference consumers

Abstract: PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to investigate the pricing strategy and the impact of agents' risk preference in a dual-channel supply chain in which both agents are risk-averse.Design/methodology/approachThe authors make use of the mean-variance (MV) method to measure the risk aversion of the agents and apply Stackelberg game to obtain the optimal strategies of the proposed models. Furthermore, the authors compare the optimal strategies with that in the benchmark model in which no agent is risk-averse.Fin… Show more

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Cited by 8 publications
(7 citation statements)
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References 43 publications
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“…Aiming at the supply chain interruption, Kang et al discussed the impact of insured manufacturers in the dual-channel supply chain on the expected profit of the supply chain interruption (Kang et al, 2020). Some scholars have conducted research on the pricing strategy of dual-channel supply chain (Yi et al, 2021;Li et al, 2021a, b;Wang et al, 2021d).…”
Section: ) Routing Problemmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Aiming at the supply chain interruption, Kang et al discussed the impact of insured manufacturers in the dual-channel supply chain on the expected profit of the supply chain interruption (Kang et al, 2020). Some scholars have conducted research on the pricing strategy of dual-channel supply chain (Yi et al, 2021;Li et al, 2021a, b;Wang et al, 2021d).…”
Section: ) Routing Problemmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…(2018) took interest in studying the optimal remanufacturing and pricing decisions under uncertain market demand scenario in the CLSC which composed of two risk sensitive retailers and a single OEM, the results show that when one retailer is more risk-averse, another retailer is likely to set a higher selling price; the OEM will achieve higher recovery to receive higher revenue, while the two retailers will both decline their profits. Wang et al. (2021b) conducted a specific research on the optimal pricing decisions on a dyadic supply chain composed of a single risk-averse manufacturer and one risk-averse retailer, the result showed that the wholesale price and retailing price will be lower than that in the scenario when the two members are both risk-neutral.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Ke et al (2018) took interest in studying the optimal remanufacturing and pricing decisions under uncertain market demand scenario in the CLSC which composed of two risk sensitive retailers and a single OEM, the results show that when one retailer is more risk-averse, another retailer is likely to set a higher selling price; the OEM will achieve higher recovery to receive higher revenue, while the two retailers will both decline their profits. Wang et al (2021b) conducted a specific research on the optimal pricing decisions on a dyadic supply chain composed of a single risk-averse manufacturer and one risk-averse retailer, the result showed that the wholesale price and retailing price will be lower than that in the scenario when the two members are both risk-neutral. constructed a CLSC which is made up of one capital-constrained OEM and a single riskaverse supplier, the OEM can get the capital flow from bank loan, trade credit and partial trade credit with bank loan (PTC-with-BL), coming to the conclusion that the PTC-with-BL K 52,8 scheme would be better than the other financing schemes when the supplier's risk-averse factor is high, which can strengthen both member's marginal profit and the expected profit of whole supply chain through contrastive analysis in mathematical simulations.…”
Section: Risk Averse In Clscmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As is well known, in a Stackelberg game one player acts first and the other player acts second. Many scholars have used Stackelberg games to investigate price strategies in supply chain management [14][15][16]. Similarly to Li et al [6], we adopted consistent pricing in a dual-channel supply chain.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%