The Principle of Cyclicality of the Second-Order Election Theory for Simultaneous Multi-Level Elections

Abstract

The principle of cyclicality in the leading theory of multi‐level voting – second‐order election theory – assumes that simultaneous multi‐level voting should be congruent and that regional electoral contests should have no second‐order election effects: regional turnout should not decrease, parties in office should not lose support, while opposition, small and new parties should not attract more votes. This article tests the principle of cyclicality of second‐order election theory against a set of simultaneous multi‐level elections in order to explain why second‐order election effects rise and fall.

How Second-Order Is the Regional Level? An Analysis of Tweets in Simultaneous Campaigns

“…This is a very interesting result, not least because we analysed coinciding elections. It is often stated (Fabre and Maddens, 2009; Jeffery and Hough, 2006; Romanova, 2014; Tenscher, 2014) that the ‘risk’ of regional subordination is larger when campaigns are held simultaneously than when elections are held at different moments. Hence, if the regional level is not overshadowed by the national level during coinciding elections, there is a good chance that this is also not the case in separate elections which are more common in federations.…”

“…The scholars who analyse voting behaviour in second-order elections all emphasise that simultaneity reinforces election congruence (Dandoy, 2013; Jeffery and Hough, 2006: 251; Romanova, 2014). This means that voters vote for the same parties in the national and the regional election and that this effect is stronger in the case of simultaneous elections.…”

“…This means that voters vote for the same parties in the national and the regional election and that this effect is stronger in the case of simultaneous elections. According to Charlie Jeffery and Daniel Hough (2006) and Valentyna Romanova (2014), this congruence is due to the subordination of the regional level. Régis Dandoy (2013), however, states that this congruence is the result of the regionalisation of national elections.…”

Towards a scholarship on regional elections

“…There is now a large and still accumulating body of evidence that increasing regional authority and strong regional identities decrease the nationalization of regional elections. Regional party systems become increasingly dissimilar from national party systems and the second-order nature of regional elections declines to the extent regional government becomes more powerful and/or regional cleavages are present and politically mobilized (Dandoy and Schakel 2013;Hough and Jeffery 2006;Romanova 2014;Schakel 2017). This body of literature thereby clearly depicts a 'more nuanced picture' of nationalization theory and the second-order election model.…”

Het effect van politieke sofisticatie op de (intentie tot) opkomst bij eerste- en tweederangsverkiezingen in België en Nederland

“…Schakel en Jeffery (2013) tonen aan dat hoe meer autonomie een regio heeft, hoe minder tweederangskarakteristieken er worden gevonden op het regionale niveau. Andere studies tonen ook aan dat de mate waarin een regionale verkiezing van tweede rang is, afhangt van de institutionele en politieke setting (Jeffery & Hough, 2003;Romanova, 2014). De Belgische regio's hebben een hoge mate van autonomie en Deschouwer (2012, p. 133) stelt dan ook: "In Belgium though it is hard to see which elections are first order and which are second order.…”