The Problem of Global Environmental Protection

Barrett, Scott

doi:10.1093/oxrep/6.1.68

Cited by 211 publications

(75 citation statements)

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“…Barrett (1990), Rübbelke (2006), Tremblay (2007, 2011) and Fujita (2011) suggested applyingmatching schemes in order to address the inefficiency in global climate protection.By matching, which is an approach that was first proposed by Guttman (1978Guttman ( , 1987, governments negotiate about so-called matching rates,…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Private Provision of International Impure Public Goods: The Case of Climate Policy

2011

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Private Provision of International Impure Public Goods: The Case of Climate Policy

2011

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“…Barrett 1990;Carraro and Siniscalco 1993;Hoel and Schneider 1997). 2 Fewer papers have suggested that the expectation of a forthcoming agreement may lead actors (governments or sources of pollution) to alter their behavior.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Production of Chlorofluorocarbons in Anticipation of the Montreal Protocol

Auffhammer

Morzuch

Stranlund

2005

Environ Resource Econ

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Abstract. Anticipation of an International Environmental Agreement provides an incentive for countries to change their production behavior prior to negotiations in order to gain a favorable bargaining position. Increased historical production figures at the time of negotiations may influence the magnitude of the baseline from which cutbacks will be specified. In this paper we empirically measure the magnitude of such strategic production behavior in the case of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer of 1987. Due to data limitations we specify a two player Nash-Cournot game between the United States and the rest of the world. We find evidence of asymmetric strategic behavior, which resulted in a net increase of aggregate world chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) production.

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“…Even for large-scale environmental problems, sustainability is viable when a working institution is established, e.g. the international treaty regime to reduce the anthropogenic impact on the stratospheric ozone has been widely considered to be a successful effort to protect the global atmosphere (Barrett, 1990;Dietz et al, 2003). However, such success has not been universally achieved in handling other largescale environmental problems.…”

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confidence: 99%

Governance of large-scale environmental problems: the case of climate change

Sun¹,

Wennersten²,

Brandt³

2010

IJGW

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This paper focuses on the management of climate change mitigation (CCM), seeking a working institution capable of addressing its cross-scale and multi-level challenges. Currently, two most studied forms of institution are co-management and transnational networks, of which a common point is that they both attempt to build up cooperative networks. While cooperative networks have a general form of viability, this paper develops an interactions check table (ICT) to illustrate those interactions between stakeholders in those two forms of cooperative networks. On the basis of the ICT analysis, this paper makes suggestions for improving cooperative networks as a working institution.Keywords: climate change mitigation (CCM); co-management; transnational networks; cooperative networks. Biographical notes:Qie Sun is a PhD student at the Department of Industrial Ecology, Royal Institute of Technology, Sweden. He received his Master of Management (2006) degree from the Ocean University of China, Qingdao, China. His research focuses on the management and assessment of climate change mitigation projects, especially as regard the clean development mechanism and Chinese energy and mitigation policies. His research interests also include environmental economics, sustainable urban planning and decision-making techniques.Ronald Wennersten is the professor and the head of the Department of Industrial Ecology, Royal Institute of Technology (KTH), Sweden, the head of the Joint Research Centre for Industrial Ecology, Shandong University, China, and a guest professor at the Shandong University and the South East University, China. He has published over 100 books and articles in international journals and conferences. He is an active member of various international scientific organisations and serves as an editorial board member of various prestigious international journals.Nils Brandt is an associate professor of the Department of Industrial Ecology, Royal Institute of Technology (KTH), Sweden. He has published more than 70 books and articles in international journals and conferences. He has supervised/co-supervised many PhD and master students. His research area includes sustainable urban planning, industrial ecology, climate change actions and strategies, environmental system analysis and ecological engineering.

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The Problem of Global Environmental Protection

Cited by 211 publications

References 0 publications

The Private Provision of International Impure Public Goods: The Case of Climate Policy

The Private Provision of International Impure Public Goods: The Case of Climate Policy

Production of Chlorofluorocarbons in Anticipation of the Montreal Protocol

Governance of large-scale environmental problems: the case of climate change

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