The Problem of Individuation in the Middle Ages

King, Peter

doi:10.1111/j.1755-2567.2000.tb01161.x

Cited by 19 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…that an individual might be constituted in its individuality by some accidental properties determined by spatio-temporal location (Gracia 1984, chapter-4). To this Peter Abelard (King 2000) that accidental feature characterizes something-they are attributes in one or the other. This objection of Abelard may be reformulated as to state that the individuality of an individual cannot be due to some properties that is derivative from the individual itself.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 98%

Revisiting Potentiality Argument

Mitra¹

2018

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The moral status of the human embryo remains one of the most intractable issues in the Bio-Medical Ethics. One of the most famous and oft-repeated argument brought in morality of embryo use for research is the potentiality argument which maintains that the embryo’s potential to become a person and enjoy the life valued by persons and it follows that its destruction is morally impermissible. In this paper I have tried to revisit the potentiality argument and offer to show that potentiality is a variable value and is dependent on external condition and would not justify embryonic personhood.The paper also argue to show that if embryo be established as an individual entity as a condition for ‘personhood’ then we need to prove its indivisibility. But the twinning of embryo is a manifestation that we do not have a person since in this fission we get two whole instead of parts. The paper endeavours to point out that reality is single individual and individuation marks the distinguishing traits of human rights.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 98%

Revisiting Potentiality Argument

Mitra¹

2018

Preprint

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“…It could be argued, however, that universals such as "Horse", "Shetland Pony" and "Apaloosa" are merely fictitious and that "Prancer" is the only real entity. This is the so-called "nominalist" school of thought in philosophy (32). While "Prancer" is the only real entity, we can nevertheless apply abstraction and classify both "Prancer" and "Socks" with the concept "Shetland Pony".…”

Section: Abstraction Argumentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Philosophically, using a unique identifier to unambiguously reference a model element could be regarded as using a causal theory of reference based on baptism (32), i.e., one that uses so-called proper names for entities, rather than involving general terms. It could further be argued that philosophers such as Ockham, Buridan, and Kripke favour such a causal theory of reference over approaches that require universals such as "Dog" (32). Ultimately, however, it only matters whether not using a general term (such as "Dog") to reference instances (such as "Lassie") has any detrimental effects in practical modelling.…”

Section: Complex Modellingmentioning

confidence: 99%

In defence of deep modelling

Atkinson¹,

Kuehne²

2020

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© 2015 Elsevier B.V. Context Since multi-level modelling emerged as a strategy for leveraging classification levels in conceptual models, there have been discussions about what it entails and how best to support it. Recently, some authors have claimed that the deep modelling approach to multi-level modelling entails paradoxes and significant weaknesses. By drawing upon concepts from speech act theory and foundational ontologies these authors argue that hitherto accepted principles for deep modelling should be abandoned and an alternative approach be adopted instead (Eriksson et al., 2013). Objective We investigate the validity of these claims and motivate the need to shift the focus of the debate from philosophical arguments to modelling pragmatics. Method We present each of the main objections raised against deep modelling in turn, classify them according to the kinds of arguments put forward, and analyse the cogency of the supporting justification. We furthermore analyse the counter proposal regarding its pragmatic value for modellers. Results Most of the criticisms against deep modelling are based on mismatches between the premisses used in published definitions of deep modelling and those used by the authors as the basis of their challenges. Hence, most of the criticisms levelled at deep modelling do not actually apply to deep modelling as defined in the literature. We also explain how the proposed alternative introduces new problems of its own, and evaluate its merits from a pragmatic modelling perspective. Finally, we show how deep modelling is indeed compatible with, and can be founded on, classic work in linguistics and logic. Conclusions The inappropriate interpretations of the core principles of deep modelling identified in this article indicate that previous descriptions of them have not had sufficient clarity. We therefore provide further clarification and foundational background material to reduce the chance for future misunderstandings and help establish deep modelling as a solid foundation for multi-level modelling.

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