The problems of International Health Regulations (IHR) in the process of responding to COVID-19 and improvement measures to improve its effectiveness

A Historic Moment in Global Health—“Futureproofing” the World Against Pandemics

“…Moreover, many member states have failed to build core health capacities, with only 30% of member states meeting the IHR requirements to rapidly detect outbreaks. 3 Even though the proposals by member states to amend the IHR are far-reaching, currently there is no consensus. The various proposals by member states include introduction of intermediate or regional alert levels to trigger an international response sooner than a PHEIC and expanding the list of events that member states must report to the WHO, such as clusters of "severe acute pneumonia of unknown cause."…”

“…Moreover, many member states have failed to build core health capacities, with only 30% of member states meeting the IHR requirements to rapidly detect outbreaks . Even though the proposals by member states to amend the IHR are far-reaching, currently there is no consensus.…”

Is the proposed global treaty an answer for public health emergencies?

“…Another important question is—how the implementation by all the countries will be assured in light of difficult implementation of IHR 2005 during the COVID-19 pandemic and poor commitments towards other treaties such as on biodiversity and climate change?5 The gaps in implementation and non-compliance to IHR 20056 17 18 and the fact that nobody has been held accountable for the same, makes us rethink how a new treaty will generate the commitment that the IHR was unable to? Furthermore, countries’ capacity and ability to respond, people’s autonomy, unjustified travel and trade restrictions—will also affect implementation of any treaty per se and make the implementation extremely challenging.…”

Implementation, compliance, and pandemic legal obligations

“…It is argued by some,(5) including the Independent Panel on Pandemic Preparedness and Response, (6) that poor IHR compliance is largely due to the lack of effective compliance mechanisms within the Regulations, (7) and that this could be rectified by the inclusion of such mechanisms (or even sanctions) in the Regulations and/or the Pandemic Treaty. Indeed, some scholars have gone so far as to claim that "enforcement mechanisms appear to be the only treaty design choice that holds promise of maximizing the chances of achieving intended effects" and that treaties "that do not have enforcement mechanisms are unlikely to be worth their considerable effort.…”