The Processing of Racial Crisis in America

Lipsky, Michael; Olson, David J.

doi:10.1177/003232927600600103

Cited by 27 publications

(21 citation statements)

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“…As noted above, this visibility is one of the latent functions of commissions. However, it also means that any obvious nonuse of available, respected empirical knowledge will create clear controversy (Lipsky and Olsen, 1977;Peterson, 1984;Crandall, 1984). In this regard the commission appears to be organizationally more similar to a legislature than an administrative bureaucracy.…”

Section: Commissions As Knowledge Use Settingsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Commissions and the Use of Social Science Research

Louis

Perlman

1985

Knowledge

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Social scientists are increasingly involved in the work of appocnted commissions. As advisers, consultants, or members of such bodies, social scientists may have an opportunity to promote the use of social science knowledge in the policymaking process. Based on existing literature, a model for analyzing the behavior of commissions is developed, and the role of social science in the model is discussed. The model is then applied to the case of Boston's Safe Schools Commission. Data on how social science was used by this commission are used to suggest several modifications to the model Despite many constraints that prevent commissions from taking full advantage of social science, it is concluded that they frequently provide a significant vehicle for increasing the influence of social science on policy.Commissions play a significant role in policymaking in the public and private sectors of this country. Their findings and recommendations are shaped by a number of influences, one of which is the contribution of social science. This article explores

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Section: Commissions As Knowledge Use Settingsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Commissions and the Use of Social Science Research

Louis

Perlman

1985

Knowledge

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“…Their acceptability, Lipsky and Olson (1976) suggested comes from the pluralist nature of their composition (see also Johnson, 1978;Jones, 1978: 284). In short, they are really mechanisms for processing conflict.…”

Section: Commissions Of Inquirymentioning

confidence: 99%

Personalization of Power in an Elected Government: Eric Williams and Trinidad and Tobago, 1973-1981

Parris

1983

J. inter-Am. stud. world aff.

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JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.. Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Miami is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs. A n article written for my forthcoming book on Trinidad andTobago argues that the events of 1969-1970 in Trinidad should be seen as a result of a process of delegitimization-both personal and systematic-and that the public declaration by Trinidad and Tobago's prime minister of his intention to resign as political leader of the governing party was an attempt to arrest that process. My argument is that the attempt failed, and that by December 1973, The leader of the People's National Movement and Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago had come full circle. In 1956 the business community, the established churches and some elements of the East Indian community were opposed to his ascendency in the political system. By 1973, it was these elements that were urging him to stay [Parris, forthcoming].Although continuing the discussion, this article focuses more on the consequences for the political system of the continued attempt to arrest the process of delegitimization. It really asks the question: What kinds of responses did this continuing process evoke from the prime minister and political leader, and what kind of system emerged?Our contention is that the period 1973-1981 reveals increased domination of the system by the prime minister and political leader. This domination, we contend, displayed the following major characteristic-rule through "interlocking directorates." Earlier Thinking on the Phenomenon As early as 1969, Adrian Espinet and Jacques Farmer took the position that Eric Williams, prime minister of Trinidad and Tobago, ruled over a system which "in fact, if not in principle, comes closer to the Republican presidential type than to the nominal Westminster Cabinet model (Espinet and Farmer, 1969).In examining the specific features of this system, they contended that no Commonwealth Prime Minister, not even Nkrumah at the height of his powers, has held so much personal control-direct and indirect-over the portfolios of his government. Finance, Planning, Development, Tobago Affairs, Community Development, local Government-all fall more or less directly within his competence.... Williams, in short, is the only begetter [Espinet and Farmer, 1969: 3].

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“…In addition to the original government publication, a Bantam Books edition sold out 30,000 copies in three days. Another 1.6 million copies were sold between March and June 1968 (Lipsky and Olson ). The KCR (:1) rocked both academic and layperson circles with mentions of “white racism,” “white power,” “white terrorism,” and now‐infamous lines such as “white society is deeply implicated in the ghetto.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Of Riots and Racism: Fifty Years Since the Best Laid Schemes of the Kerner Commission (1968–2018)

Hughey

2018

Sociological Forum

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“What happened? Why did it happen? What can be done to prevent it from happening again and again?” Voiced less that one week after the July 1967 race riots in Detroit, Michigan, Lyndon B. Johnson spoke these words as he ordered the establishment of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. Seven months later, on March 1, 1968, the Commission's account—known as the Kerner Commission Report—was a scathing appraisal of riots and racism in the United States. While it included bold language about the linkage between rioting and racism, it is rife with paradoxical assumptions and findings. Moreover, the report's failure to define sociological concepts, coupled with a reliance on individualism and cognitive attitudes via psycho‐analytic and pop‐psychological conjecture, together beckon scholars to wrestle with how this state‐issued report reflected and reproduced dominant assumptions about the “race” concept, violence, and human nature. Employing a critical content analysis of the report, I ask: How does the Kerner Commission Report define and use the concept of “riots” and “racism,” and what are the logics employed in the production of that knowledge?

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The Processing of Racial Crisis in America

Cited by 27 publications

References 0 publications

Commissions and the Use of Social Science Research

Commissions and the Use of Social Science Research

Personalization of Power in an Elected Government: Eric Williams and Trinidad and Tobago, 1973-1981

Of Riots and Racism: Fifty Years Since the Best Laid Schemes of the Kerner Commission (1968–2018)

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