The Productive Anarchy of Scientific Imagination

Stuart, Michael T.

doi:10.1086/710629

Cited by 38 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…The first, the “logic‐based” approach, claims that we ought to constrain our imaginings in a way that accords with the rules of inference (e.g., by making arguments that have true premises and are valid). The second, the “model‐based” approach, claims that we ought to constrain our imaginings so that we have an accurate representation of our target system, and the way in which we manipulate this representation should mirror how the target system would change over time (2020, p. 970).…”

Section: Imagination Knowledge and Constraintsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Imagination in science

Murphy

2022

Philosophy Compass

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While discussions of the imagination have been limited in philosophy of science, this is beginning to change. In recent years, a vast literature on imagination in science has emerged. This paper surveys the current field, including the changing attitudes towards the scientific imagination, the fiction view of models, how the imagination can lead to knowledge and understanding, and the value of different types of imagination. It ends with a discussion of the gaps in the current literature, indicating avenues for future research.

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Section: Imagination Knowledge and Constraintsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…When we conduct this thought experiment, we do not have an accurate representation of this situation. For example, we cannot accurately imagine ‘what a wave of light traveling parallel to you would “look” like’ as we cannot see beams of light (Stuart, 2020, pp. 974–975).…”

Section: Imagination Knowledge and Constraintsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Imagination in science

Murphy

2022

Philosophy Compass

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“…Many imaginative thinkers submit themselves to rule-based constraints (e.g., alternative physics, etc.) or even materials constraints to force novel creativity, and that is a worthy area for future study (Stuart 2020 ). But we need a better understanding of the limits, boundaries, and failures of the whole operating system that we call imagination.…”

Section: Constraints On Imaginationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Imagination: A New Foundation for the Science of Mind

Asma

2022

Biol Theory

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After a long hiatus, psychology and philosophy are returning to formal study of imagination. While excellent work is being done in the current environment, this article argues for a stronger thesis than usually adopted. Imagination is not just a peripheral feature of cognition or a domain for aesthetic research. It is instead the core operating system or cognitive capacity for humans and has epistemic and therapeutic functions that ground all our sense-making activities. A sketch of imagination as embodied cognition is offered, followed by suggestions of how to organize imagination studies into a more rigorous science–humanities research area.

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“…22 It is often highlighted that the imagination has to be appropriately constrained if it is to provide insights about the world. What we emphasise here is not that the imagination is totally unconstrained when it is fruitful in science, but rather that it can allow for reasoning that is less restrictive than that in arguments or computer simulations (see also Stuart, 2020). 23 Focusing on imagination allows us to capture this sense of surprise without committing to a platonic view of thought experiments.…”

Section: Theoretical Surprisementioning

confidence: 99%

The Value of Surprise in Science

French

Murphy

2021

Erkenn

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Scientific results are often presented as ‘surprising’ as if that is a good thing. Is it? And if so, why? What is the value of surprise in science? Discussions of surprise in science have been limited, but surprise has been used as a way of defending the epistemic privilege of experiments over simulations. The argument is that while experiments can ‘confound’, simulations can merely surprise (Morgan, 2005). Our aim in this paper is to show that the discussion of surprise can be usefully extended to thought experiments and theoretical derivations. We argue that in focusing on these features of scientific practice, we can see that the surprise-confoundment distinction does not fully capture surprise in science. We set out how thought experiments and theoretical derivations can bring about surprises that can be disruptive in a productive way, and we end by exploring how this links with their future fertility.

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The Productive Anarchy of Scientific Imagination

Cited by 38 publications

References 29 publications

Imagination in science

Imagination in science

Imagination: A New Foundation for the Science of Mind

The Value of Surprise in Science

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