Employment protection is the result of labor laws as well as of institutional factors not encompassed in official legislation. Courts' delays in settling labor disputes are among those factors. Using individual data from the Italian Labour Force Survey (2008)(2009)(2010) and exploiting the territorial heterogeneity in the duration of labor trials across Italian regions we investigate the effect of courts' delays on the composition of employment. We find that labor courts' delays reduce the employment rate and increase inactivity of specific categories of workers, i.e., women, young, and low-skilled individuals; they also reduce the likelihood of accessing a permanent occupation and increase the incidence of long-term unemployment for the same groups of workers.There are no fixed times for the administration of justice, or its execution, in this unaccountable country. (Pictures from Italy, Charles Dickens, 1846) 42 / GIUSEPPINA GIANFREDA AND GIOVANNA VALLANTI 10 If wages are flexible, then the transfer component of firing costs (i.e., severance payment component) translates into lower initial wages, with smaller or no effects on firms' hiring decision (Lazear 1990). However, in the absence of full contractual flexibility in the wage-setting process, severance payments still have real effects on employment (Garibaldi and Violante 2005; Kahn 2007). 11 On empirical grounds, firing costs have been shown to negatively affect job flows (