The Propaganda of the Deed: Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Mobilization

Abstract

Many terrorist factions care about the level of popular support they enjoy within a population they claim to represent. Empirically, this level of support can either rise or fall in the aftermath of a campaign of terrorist violence. Under what circumstances is the use of terror an effective tactic for mobilizing political support for an extremist group? This article models a scenario in which an extremist faction considers attacking a government in the hopes of provoking a counterterror response that will radicalize the population, increasing the extremists' support at the expense of a more moderate faction. In our scenario, such radicalization can result either from the economic damage caused by counterterror operations or by the way in which such operations change the population's assessment of the government's motivations. We demonstrate that such attempts at mobilizing public support can be, but need not be, successful, discuss factors that make both the initiation of a terror campaign and successful mobilization more or less likely, and relate our results to several empirical cases. I t is often argued, by scholars and "practitioners" alike, that terrorism is a powerful tool for generating support for a violent extremist movement. 1 A central intuition underlying this idea is that terrorists use violence to provoke governments into harsh and indiscriminate counterterrorism responses in order to radicalize and mobilize a population whose interests the terrorists claim to represent. Examples abound both from history and the current day.Bell (1971) argues that the first successful use of guerrilla tactics in the twentieth century was by Irish Catholics during the "Rising" in Dublin in 1916. The British responded with harsh countermeasures. Several scholars, however, argue that the British response ultimately strengthened the republican cause. English writes, "The British response to republican subversion frequently involved punishing the wider population for IRA activities: this had the unintended-indeed, counterproductiveeffect of strengthening the IRA that it was intended to undermine" (2003,

Both sides retaliate in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict

“…Second, though Qassams are not particularly effective at killing Israelis, they do cause significant psychological distress among Israelis (though not incurring a military response from Israel in the period under investigation, discussed below), which is mirrored in the strong political and public response to the rocket attacks in Israel (3, 7). A related possibility is that rocket attacks are used by Palestinian factions (particular extremist ones) to solidify their position and reputation among the Palestinian population (31)(32)(33)9). Finally, attacks may be used to affect political opinion in Israel (34-36), cause economic damage to Israel (37,38), or, more generally, to derail the peace process (12,39).…”

Could education promote the Israeli-Palestinian peace process?

“…For instance, Berman and Laitin (2005) develop a 'club good' model where poverty breeds terrorism. This link can also be found in Bueno de Mesquita (2005) and Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson (2007). Jaeger et al (2008) find that individuals with some college or more advanced education are less likely to support Hamas, and more likely to support Fatah or other smaller factions.…”

The formation of terrorist groups: an analysis of Irish republican organizations

“…Historically, moderates have not always gone along with the extremist turn in a cell. Dnes and Garoupa (2010) (English, 2003;de Mesquita and Dickson, 2007). Nonetheless, some of the observed increased extremism may reflect intensification of efforts to retain publicgood aspects of discipline within the remaining group.…”