The Propensity to Learn Shared Cultural Knowledge from Social Group Members: Selective Imitation in 18-month-olds

Abstract

Fourteen-month-olds selectively imitated a sub-efficient means (illuminating a lightbox by a head-touch) when this was modeled by linguistic ingroup members in video-demonstrations. A follow-up study with slightly older infants, however, could replicate this effect only in a video-demonstration context. Hence it still remains unclear whether infants' apparent tendency to be selective in learning opaque manners of novel skills from linguistic ingroup members is, indeed, a characteristic constraining property of cultural knowledge transmission that can be reliably manifested in live demonstration contexts that are more representative of naturalistic learning environments. To answer this question, we aimed to replicate the original study using live demonstration with a group of older infants (N = 48; 28 females). We found that eighteen-month-olds imitated the opaque manner of sub-efficient means action as a function of whether the demonstrator was a speaker of their own language. In a no-demonstration control group, infants relied on the self-discovered efficient means (handaction), just like infants observing the foreign speaker. These findings suggest that selectivity in learning sub-efficient opaque actions from linguistic ingroups has evolved to support transmission of culturespecific manner of action practices shared within social groups.Humans are unique in their capacity to acquire and faithfully transmit culturally shared action routines. Given their cognitively opaque and arbitrary characteristics, while acquiring such customary, normative and sub-efficient action routines, naïve learners mostly rely on demonstrations by knowledgeable others . As shown by previous research, ostensive communicative signals (e.g., establishing eye contact and being addressed by infant directed speech) have a special role in aiding infants' acquisition of cognitively opaque information , 2009Gergely, Egyed, & Király, 2007). Ostensive signals facilitate infants' learning about the functions of novel tools despite the opacity of their demonstrated manner of operation and the manifested function served by the novel artifacts (Futó, Téglás, Csibra, & Gergely, 2010). They also help infants to form novel means-actions representations (Hernik & Csibra, 2015), highlight the hidden dispositional properties of objects (

Infants preferentially learn from surprising teachers

“…The total sample size of 48 infants was determined prior to the start of the experiment based on prior research with similar sample sizes (e.g., Altınok et al., 2021; Gergely et al., 2002; Howard et al., 2015; Meltzoff, 1988). In Experiment 1, 32 full‐term infants between 13 and 17.5 months participated ( M = 15 months, 1 day; range = 13 months, 5 days–17 months, 14 days); 19 were female.…”

“…In Experiment 1, 32 full‐term infants between 13 and 17.5 months participated ( M = 15 months, 1 day; range = 13 months, 5 days–17 months, 14 days); 19 were female. This age range was selected based on previous studies that have employed the rational imitation paradigm with infants between 13 and 18 months of age (e.g., Altınok et al., 2021; Buttelmann et al., 2013; Gergely et al., 2002; Howard et al., 2015; Meltzoff, 1988; Zmyj et al., 2010). Thirteen additional infants were excluded due to fussiness (4), parental interference (3), sibling interference (1), inattentiveness (such that infants did not watch the Object Event; 3) or equipment failure (2).…”

“…Rather, infants are selective in their teachers. For example, they will learn from or imitate novel actions performed by individuals who are reliable or are members of their in‐group, but not those who are unreliable or are members of an out‐group (e.g., Altınok et al., 2021; Brooker & Poulin‐Dubois, 2013; Buttelmann et al., 2013; Chow et al., 2008; Crivello et al., 2018; Howard et al., 2015; Poulin‐Dubois et al., 2011; Tummeltshammer et al., 2014; Zmyj et al., 2010). Thus, infants infer that certain kinds of individuals are effective teachers.…”

If you presume relevance, you don't need a bifocal lens

“…Furthermore, the acquisition of such “opaque” practices is often not primarily motivated by affiliative needs, but by a fundamental epistemic drive to learn the relevant knowledge of their cultural communities (Gergely, 2013; Gergely & Jacob, 2012; Király et al, 2013). This is evidenced by selective imitation studies showing children's faithful copying of cognitively opaque actions from ingroup demonstrators even in their absence (Altınok, Király, & Gergely, 2022; Buttelmann, Zmyj, Daum, & Carpenter, 2013). In sum, unlike BST, which presupposes social interactions to reflect the segregation of diagnostic indexes (cues) and payoff types (rewards), the relevance-guided learning mechanism sketched here dispenses with such assumptions.…”

If you presume relevance, you don’t need a bifocal lens (Commentary on Jagiello et al., 2022, BBS.)

“…Furthermore, the acquisition of such "opaque" practices is often not primarily motivated by affiliative needs, but by a fundamental epistemic drive to learn the relevant knowledge of their cultural communities (Gergely, 2013;Gergely & Jacob, 2012;Király et al, 2013). This is evidenced by selective imitation studies showing children's faithful copying of cognitively opaque actions from ingroup demonstrators even in their absence (Altınok, Király, & Gergely, 2022;Buttelmann, Zmyj, Daum, & Carpenter, 2013). In sum, unlike BST, which presupposes social interactions to reflect the segregation of diagnostic indexes (cues) and payoff types (rewards), the relevance-guided learning mechanism sketched here dispenses with such assumptions.…”