The provision strategy of blockchain service under the supply chain with downstream competition

Liu, Jiaguo; Zhao, Huida; Lyu, Yibing; Yue, Xiaohang

doi:10.1007/s10479-022-05034-2

Cited by 10 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 56 publications

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“…Considering a higher traceability level means more data need to be recorded and verified on the blockchain, which increases the complexity and resource consumption of the system, it is reasonable to apply a quadratic cost structure. This has also been validated by previous studies [61,63]. However, this study further considers the cost structure of endogenous traceability efforts when adopting the BTS.…”

Section: Model Sm: Manufacturer Leading the Implementation Of The Btssupporting

confidence: 70%

Enhancing Traceability in Wine Supply Chains through Blockchain: A Stackelberg Game-Theoretical Analysis

Kang,

Shi,

Yue

et al. 2023

JTAER

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Blockchain technology has been adopted to improve traceability and authenticity in wine supply chains (WSCs). However, whether through outsourcing or self-implementation of a blockchain-based wine traceability system (BTS), there are significant costs involved, as well as concerns regarding consumer privacy. Motivated by observations of real-world practice, we explore the value of blockchain in enhancing traceability and authenticity in WSCs through a Stackelberg game-theoretical analysis. By comparing the equilibrium solutions of the scenarios with and without blockchain, we uncover the value of blockchain in tracing wine products. Our findings show that blockchain adoption can increase WSC prices under certain conditions. We derive the threshold for a third-party BTS service fee that determines blockchain adoption for tracing wine products and reveal the moderating effect of consumer traceability preferences and privacy concerns. Furthermore, the investigation of who should lead the implementation of BTS finds that the equal cost sharing between the manufacturer and the retailer results in no difference in BTS implementation leadership. Otherwise, the manufacturer always benefits from taking the lead in the implementation of BTS, and the retailer should undertake a leadership role in BTS implementation if they need to bear higher costs.

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Section: Model Sm: Manufacturer Leading the Implementation Of The Btssupporting

confidence: 70%

Enhancing Traceability in Wine Supply Chains through Blockchain: A Stackelberg Game-Theoretical Analysis

Kang,

Shi,

Yue

et al. 2023

JTAER

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“… A heterogeneous graph variant network (S_HGTNs) suitable for smart contract anomaly detection is constructed to detect financial fraud on Ethereum platform Liu et al. 183 LION (Lightweight and Identifier-Oblivious Engine) Bitcoin P2P security research provides information The detection accuracy of the model for attack prototypes and real-world anomalies exceeds 97% F1-score. Build the LION model for anomaly detection in the P2P network of cryptocurrency blockchain, and conduct data-driven research and evaluation on LION Fan et al.…”

Section: Overview Of Cryptocurrencymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For processing heterogeneous information, Liu et al. 183 built a heterogeneous graph transformation network based on CNN for contract anomaly detection and employed this model to detect financial fraud on the Ethereum platform. Fan et al.…”

Section: Deep Learning In Cryptocurrencymentioning

confidence: 99%

A survey of deep learning applications in cryptocurrency

Zhang,

Cai,

Wen

2024

iScience

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“…Liu et al. (2023) discussed the provisioning strategy of blockchain service in a supply chain with the downstream competition. It constructed a game‐theoretic model to find the equilibrium strategy from a manufacturer and two competing retailers and investigated the results for market effects, economic effects, service effects, and service efficiency.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This novel finding distinguishes from previous studies about the impact of the BSP on supply chain management. Third, among the few papers (Liu et al.,2023; Song et al., 2022) that discuss channel competition within the blockchain background, we have innovatively expanded the consideration of the potential blockchain characteristics (i.e., the quality disclosure and the network externalities) and the impact of blockchain‐related policies on channel competition.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sales channel competition for supply chain with the blockchain technology

Kang,

Shi,

Liu

2023

Int Trans Operational Res

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The emerging blockchain‐supported platforms (BSPs) become prevalent with higher product quality and guaranteed authenticity, making the competition between BSP and traditional sales channels (TSC) gain attention. To explore the optimal operation strategies for retailers in TSC and BSP, we develop the vertically differentiated model to describe the channel competition and derive optimal decisions for two retailers. Then, the BSP's comparative advantage and the value of blockchain technology are analyzed. Next, we examine how blockchain quality disclosure and network externalities affect channel competition, as well as the impact of government policies. We find that (i) a higher quality improvement in BSP will simultaneously increase both retail prices and retailers’ profit under some circumstances. Meanwhile, the counterfeit sold in the TSC and channel switching hassle in the BSP make retailers’ products less competitive and reduce profits, respectively. (ii) Being a BSP retailer is not necessarily better, as blockchain's effect on product quality and consumer experience determines market share and profitability. Whether consumers can benefit from blockchain depends on the basic value of the BSP product and the aggregate level of consumer utility from the BSP. (iii) Blockchain‐based quality disclosures and network externalities might not always benefit BSPs, they could increase BSP retailers’ costs or increase competition in the market. (iv) The strict supervision policy reduces the TSC retailer's profit and product quality. Meanwhile, the technology subsidy policy contributes to the development of the BSP, but the BSP retailer needs to be wary of uncontrolled price increases due to policy spillover effects.

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The provision strategy of blockchain service under the supply chain with downstream competition

Cited by 10 publications

References 56 publications

Enhancing Traceability in Wine Supply Chains through Blockchain: A Stackelberg Game-Theoretical Analysis

Enhancing Traceability in Wine Supply Chains through Blockchain: A Stackelberg Game-Theoretical Analysis

A survey of deep learning applications in cryptocurrency

Sales channel competition for supply chain with the blockchain technology

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