This dissertation is comprised of three chapters that focus on three topics related to institutional investors' and registered insiders' trading activities around corporate announcements. This research provided insights into the trading behavior of institutions and insiders around corporate events when they are influenced by the anticipation and arrival of new information. Data samples were stratified, regression models were estimated, and control variables were added to ensure the results are significant and robust. The first chapter discussed the information signaling hypothesis around share repurchase announcements. I examined if institutions can trade profitability around the announcement time using signals from insiders and the firm. I found that only transient institutional investors are able to adjust their portfolios to take advantage of the postannouncement price run-up. The second chapter explored the relationship between information asymmetry and the information acquisition process. It appeared that institutions prefer using lower cost, small, round lot, 100-share multiples when they can acquire information in advance of the event as in earnings announcements. The last chapter looked at if the information hierarchy hypothesis holds true at the very top of the corporate pyramid. I found that CEO trades are largely ignored and president net purchases have vi positive effects on M&A post-announcement returns. In summary, institutions, insiders, and the firm play important roles in the information dissemination and acquisition process. Hence, their decisions have profound effects on their complicated, interconnected relationships. vii