“…Those countries that did not agree to mutual reporting agreed to an anonymous withholding tax on these capital incomes. 25 The treasury provides data on unsolicited declarations of previous evasion, see Finanzministerium des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, 2010, 2014 26 Estimates of the elasticity of taxable income (ETI) in general cover a wide range, primarily depending on the instrumentation of the net-of-tax rate (see for example Saez et al (2012), Weber (2014), Aronsson et al (2017), and Neisser (2021)). Doerrenberg et al (2017) show that the ETI in Germany seems to be primarily driven by deductions rather than real income generation: in their baseline specification, they find an ETI with respect to the net-of-tax rate Net income effect (% of pre-reform ENI) consider a range of different magnitudes of the elasticity of reported capital income in a back-ofthe-envelope calculation: Figure 3 shows the change of the NIE and NIE2 by income fractile if reported capital income reacts to its marginal net-of-tax rate with an elasticity between zero (corresponding to results in section 5) and one.…”