2018
DOI: 10.1080/13597566.2018.1451846
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The quest for regional legitimation: Analyzing the Arab League’s legitimizing role in the Arab spring

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Cited by 23 publications
(8 citation statements)
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“…It did not follow this in the events that took place in Yemen and Bahrain, despite the severity of the violations that occurred in both countries. (Wajner & Kacowicz, 2018) In February 2011, the Arab League suspended the right of the Libyan state to participate in all institutions and meetings of the League in protest against the practices of violence against civilians, followed by a meeting of the League Council, which was at the ministerial level to discuss developments and political events in the state of Libya. Resolution 7298 was issued on March 2, 2011, (Zifcak, 2012) regarding the events in Libya.…”
Section: External Parties Intervene In Libya During the 2011 Events: mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It did not follow this in the events that took place in Yemen and Bahrain, despite the severity of the violations that occurred in both countries. (Wajner & Kacowicz, 2018) In February 2011, the Arab League suspended the right of the Libyan state to participate in all institutions and meetings of the League in protest against the practices of violence against civilians, followed by a meeting of the League Council, which was at the ministerial level to discuss developments and political events in the state of Libya. Resolution 7298 was issued on March 2, 2011, (Zifcak, 2012) regarding the events in Libya.…”
Section: External Parties Intervene In Libya During the 2011 Events: mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Saudi Arabia’s response stood out in its unreserved support of the Egyptian government while also expressing discontent with Western interference with Egypt’s security and stability. However, as the overthrow of Husni Mubarak seemed more and more realistic, most of the other Arab governments seemed to distance themselves from him; and once he resigned, they largely contented with modest congratulations to the Egyptian people and hope for the return of order and stability (Wajner, 2013, pp. 31–38).…”
Section: Regionalism Conflict and Order In The Middle Eastmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It is noteworthy that, as in 1990, the decision was passed by a majority of the AL members, with Syria and Algeria expressing their opposition to any foreign intervention in Libya’s sovereign affairs. Still, it took another few days in which Qadhafi’s forces continued to advance, threatening to eliminate the rebels, before the Security Council passed a resolution on no-fly zone—leaving open the option of military operations to protect civilians in Libya (Wajner, 2013, pp. 53–55).…”
Section: Regionalism Conflict and Order In The Middle Eastmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…These dynamics require a reassessment of Saudi Arabia’s role in the Arab world. The literature on Arab regionalism in the context of the Arab uprisings to date has rather ignored the shifting balance of power and focused primarily on the LAS’ and GCC’s normative as well as interventionist role in the Libyan and the Bahraini conflict (Beck, 2013; Küçükkeleş, 2012; Wajner & Kacowicz, 2018), while, on the other hand, researchers on Saudi foreign policy have shown little interest in Riyadh’s changing role in the LAS. Some of the most comprehensive surveys of Saudi regional and foreign policy even omit the LAS altogether (see, e.g.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%