The quest for "similar instances" and "simultaneous possibilities": Metaphors in social dilemma research.

Allison, Scott T.; Beggan, James K.; Midgley, Elizabeth H.

doi:10.1037/0022-3514.71.3.479

Cited by 48 publications

(27 citation statements)

References 143 publications

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“…The claiming effect, like the commons dilemma-public goods dilemma effect, illustrates the importance of construal processes in bargainers' decisions (Allison et al, 1996). In addition, it extends the concept of procedural frames to more social psychological factors.…”

Section: The Claiming Effectmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…More important, they confirm the central role that construals play in allocation decisions and offer insight into important social psychological variables. As Allison, Beggan, and Midgley (1996) recently argued, interpretation plays a critical role in how participants behave in social dilemmas. They proposed that the metaphors evoked by an allocation task, such as "game," "arms race," "family, .... communistic society," and "chaos," convey expectations, norms, and beliefs that influence behavior (Allison et al, 1996).…”

Section: Procedural Frames In Mixed-motive Interactionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As Allison, Beggan, and Midgley (1996) recently argued, interpretation plays a critical role in how participants behave in social dilemmas. They proposed that the metaphors evoked by an allocation task, such as "game," "arms race," "family, .... communistic society," and "chaos," convey expectations, norms, and beliefs that influence behavior (Allison et al, 1996). A classic illustration is Eiser and Bhavnani's (1974) finding that cooperation rates are higher when a prisoner's dilemma is described as an international negotiation rather than economic bargaining.…”

Section: Procedural Frames In Mixed-motive Interactionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Naturally, there are many other influences of procedural description on behavior that need to be explored. We believe that procedural framing effects can be useful tools in future research for identifying new linguistic (Semin & Marsman, 1994) and metaphorical (Allison et al, 1996;Bazerman & Carroll, 1987) features that influence bargaining and allocation behavior.…”

Section: The Claiming Effectmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Semantic differences may influence interpersonal behavior by evoking different understandings of responsibility and blame for an outcome. Thus, when procedural frames are discovered, they can help identify the metaphorical (Allison et al, 1996) and semantic (Semin & Marsman, 1994) features that influence allocation preferences (Schelling, 1960). In the following research, we explore the behavioral and psychological effects of procedural frames derived from two popular paradigms in mixed-motive research: ultimatum bargaining games and sequential social dilemmas.…”

Section: Procedural Frames In Mixed-motive Interactionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 4 more Smart Citations

The claiming effect: Why players are more generous in social dilemmas than in ultimatum games.

Larrick

Blount²

1997

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

144

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The term procedural frames is introduced and defined as different representations of structurally equivalent allocation processes. Study 1 compared 2 well-known games, sequential social dilemmas and ultimatum bargaining, that share the same structure: Player 1 creates an allocation of a resource and Player 2 decides whether to allow it or deny it. Study 1 found that Player 1 made more favorable allocations and Player 2 accepted more unfavorable allocations in a social dilemma frame than in an equivalent ultimatum bargaining frame. Study 2 revealed the critical deterininant was whether Player 2 had to respond to an allocation by accepting or rejecting it (as in the ultimatum game) or by making a claim (as in the social dilemma). Two additional studies explored how these actions are perceived. The inconsistency of behavior across procedural frames raises methodological concerns but illuminates construal processes that guide allocation.Two of the most-studied paradigms in mixed-motive research have been social dilemmas and ultimatum bargaining games (Komorita & Parks, 1995). These allocation procedures differ substantially in how the actions of participants are described. In ultimatum bargaining games, players propose a division of a common resource and accept or reject the proposal; in social dilemmas, players make a claim from a common resource. However, versions of these games have been developed that are structurally equivalent but that appear to induce different rates of cooperation. Players appear to be more generous in sequential social dilemmas than in ultimatum bargaining games. The following research tests the existence of the social dilemma-ultimatum bargaining framing effect. The findings offer insight into a specific bias in bargaining, which we call the claiming effect, as well as the more general role that the subjective interpretation of action plays in allocation decisions.We contributed equally to this research. Some findings reported in Study 1 were initially reviewed in Larrick and Blount (1995).

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Section: The Claiming Effectmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Procedural Frames In Mixed-motive Interactionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Procedural Frames In Mixed-motive Interactionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Claiming Effectmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Procedural Frames In Mixed-motive Interactionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

The claiming effect: Why players are more generous in social dilemmas than in ultimatum games.

Larrick

Blount²

1997

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

144

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Social Justice: History, Theory, and Research

Jost

Kay

2010

Handbook of Social Psychology

180

197

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Applying a logic of appropriateness to understand behavioral differences between common resource dilemmas and public good dilemmas

Molenmaker

Lelieveld

Kwaadsteniet

et al. 2021

Behavioral Decision Making

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Common resource dilemmas (CRDs) and public good dilemmas (PGDs) are distinct types of social dilemmas, yet they model the same underlying conflict between the collective interest and one's self‐interest. Here, we study and interpret behavioral differences between these two main types of social dilemmas by applying a logic of appropriateness. In two experiments, we argue and demonstrate that CRDs, relative to PGDs, evoke higher levels of cooperation, because taking from collective property (in CRDs) is generally considered less appropriate than not giving from personal property (in PGDs). Importantly, these differential considerations of appropriateness are reflected not only in the willingness to cooperate but also in the willingness to punish and reward others' (non)cooperative behavior. Taken together, the findings reveal that CRDs and PGDs elicit different norms of appropriateness.

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The quest for "similar instances" and "simultaneous possibilities": Metaphors in social dilemma research.

Cited by 48 publications

References 143 publications

The claiming effect: Why players are more generous in social dilemmas than in ultimatum games.

The claiming effect: Why players are more generous in social dilemmas than in ultimatum games.

Social Justice: History, Theory, and Research

Applying a logic of appropriateness to understand behavioral differences between common resource dilemmas and public good dilemmas

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