The rational role of experience

Bourget, David

doi:10.1080/0020174x.2017.1385529

Cited by 4 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 51 publications

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“…See Section 4 of this article and Mendelovici 2018 for a defense of strong PIT. Bourget (2017cBourget ( , 2018 also defends a view in the spirit of strong PIT.…”

Section: Sciousness and Intentionalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It seems to us that the contents that are determined by the phenomenology of conscious thoughts are gisty, partial, or schematic compared to the full narrow contents that we might want to attribute to these thoughts, which might include descriptive contents of the sort described above, or even just rough characterizations like <a winged feathery animal that lays eggs and flies>. Bourget (2017cBourget ( , 2018 argues that the phenomenal contents associated with abstract or complex thoughts are often largely symbolic, representing words without precise meanings.…”

Section: Complex and Abstract Thoughtsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…40 Mendelovici (2018, §7.5) argues that one of the most important differences between the having of immediate contents and the having of reflective contents is that the latter is relative to a self-ascriber, the subject who has the dispositions to ascribe the contents to herself, whereas the former is not. Bourget (2018) argues that phenomenal intentionality and non-phenomenal intentionality play different causal and rational roles, the former allowing for genuinely content-responsive thinking and the latter allowing only for an emulation of content-responsive thinking.…”

Section: Complex and Abstract Thoughtsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Consciousness and Intentionality

Mendelovici

Bourget

2020

The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness

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Philosophers traditionally recognize two key features of mental states: intentionality and phenomenal consciousness. To a first approximation, intentionality is the ‘aboutness’ of mental states, and phenomenal consciousness is the felt, experiential, qualitative, or ‘what it’s like’ aspect of mental states. In the past few decades, these features have been widely assumed to be distinct and independent. But several philosophers have recently challenged this assumption, arguing that intentionality and consciousness are importantly related. This chapter overviews the key views on the relationship between consciousness and intentionality and describes our favored view, which is a version of the phenomenal intentionality theory, the view that the most fundamental kind of intentionality arises from phenomenal consciousness.

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“…See Section 4 of this article and Mendelovici 2018 for a defense of strong PIT. Bourget (2017cBourget ( , 2018 also defends a view in the spirit of strong PIT.…”

Section: Sciousness and Intentionalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Complex and Abstract Thoughtsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Complex and Abstract Thoughtsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Consciousness and Intentionality

Mendelovici

Bourget

2020

The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness

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“…16 Advocates of the view include Searle (1990Searle ( , 1992, Strawson (1994Strawson ( , 2008, Pitt (1999Pitt ( , 2004, Horgan and Tienson (2002), Loar (2003), Kriegel (2003, 2011), Farkas (2008a, 2008b, Horgan and Graham (2009), Chalmers (2010), Pautz (2010), Montague (2010), Bourget (2010Bourget ( , 2017bBourget ( , 2018, and Mendelovici (2010Mendelovici ( , 2018a. See Kriegel 2013, Mendelovici and Bourget 2014, and Bourget and Mendelovici 2016 for overviews of the view.…”

Section: Derived Mental Representationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Propositional Attitudes as Self-Ascriptions

Mendelovici¹

2020

Common Sense Metaphysics

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According to Lynne Rudder Baker's Practical Realism, we know that we have beliefs, desires, and other propositional attitudes independent of any scientific investigation. Propositional attitudes are an indispensable part of our everyday conception of the world and not in need of scientific validation. This paper asks what is the nature of the attitudes such that we may know them so well from a commonsense perspective. I argue for a self-ascriptivist view, on which we have propositional attitudes in virtue of ascribing them to ourselves. On this view, propositional attitudes are derived representational states, deriving their contents and their attitude types from our self-ascriptions.

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“…In short, mental states are physical states; there is an ontological equivalency between the two states (they are equal according to their actual being), and mental actions or states are a result of physical stimuli which cause physical enaction. Bourget (2018) suggests an example in order to, in his view, affirm the materialist stance, “Typically. .…”

Section: Consciousnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Information literacy and consciousness

Budd

2020

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PurposeWhile there is a huge literature devoted to information literacy (IL), much of which is devoted to course or content design and some sort of assessment. What is presented in this paper is the proposition that the design of IL would benefit greatly by the infusion of the development of consciousness and conscious states. The understanding of consciousness and its place in the absorption of information, and ultimately, knowledge growth is presented.Design/methodology/approachReviews of information literacy (brief) and consciousness (more extensive) are applied to the proposition that consciousness is an essential element of successful information literacy instruction. The reviews are of a critical nature.FindingsConsciousness and its complexity are explicated to a considerable extent. While there are somewhat varied conceptions of consciousness, a relatively unified definition is suggested. The complexities of consciousness and its development render students more able to explicate the agreements and disagreements in the information landscape. In short, a developed consciousness among students makes for more critical approaches to difficult informational events. Then, the connections between IL and consciousness, which includes the awareness of informational states, conclude the paper.Research limitations/implicationsThis paper offers a new mode for an inquiry into the content and structure of information literacy instruction.Originality/valueThe paper adds a heretofore unattended condition for success in information literacy for instructors and students.

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The rational role of experience

Cited by 4 publications

References 51 publications

Consciousness and Intentionality

Consciousness and Intentionality

Propositional Attitudes as Self-Ascriptions

Information literacy and consciousness

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