2012
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1725539
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The Real Effects of Financial Shocks: Evidence from Exogenous Changes in Analyst Coverage

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Cited by 80 publications
(92 citation statements)
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References 51 publications
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“…reporting attributes, such as disclosure quality and earnings predictability, that would make it easier to issue accurate forecasts. That analyst coverage decisions are so strongly motivated by investor demand for information about the company highlights the importance of analysts' investing clients and corroborates the idea that analyst following is a reasonable proxy for the firm's information environment (Bowen, Chen, and Cheng [2008], Derrien and Kecskés [2013]). We asked analysts for additional insights about their coverage decisions.…”
Section: T a B L E 1supporting
confidence: 56%
“…reporting attributes, such as disclosure quality and earnings predictability, that would make it easier to issue accurate forecasts. That analyst coverage decisions are so strongly motivated by investor demand for information about the company highlights the importance of analysts' investing clients and corroborates the idea that analyst following is a reasonable proxy for the firm's information environment (Bowen, Chen, and Cheng [2008], Derrien and Kecskés [2013]). We asked analysts for additional insights about their coverage decisions.…”
Section: T a B L E 1supporting
confidence: 56%
“…Both events result in the termination of analyst coverage caused by the strategic changes of the brokerage firms rather than potential negative information about the covered firms (Kelly & Ljungqvist, 2012;Wu & Zang, 2009). Previous studies have used similar events to investigate the causal effect of analysts (see, for example, Derrien & Kecskés, 2013;Hong & Kacperczyk, 2010;Kelly & Ljungqvist, 2012). Employing a difference-in-difference (DiD) approach, we find that firms losing analyst coverage from these events experience a significant decline in the market valuation of their R&D capital -the valuation coefficient of R&D capital drops by about 21.7%, on average, of the pre-event level.…”
mentioning
confidence: 79%
“…Previous studies employing similar events find that firms losing analyst coverage from these events experience worse information environments, including increased analyst optimism bias (Hong & Kacperczyk, 2010), higher information asymmetry (Kelly & Ljungqvist, 2012), lower investor recognition (Li & You, 2015), and lower quality of financial reporting (Irani & Oesch, 2013). Furthermore, the adverse consequences transmit into firms' real activities such as lower levels of investment (Derrien & Kecskés, 2013) and slower growth (Billett, Garfinkel, & Yu, 2017). He and Tian (2013) find evidence of productive patenting activities after firms lose analyst coverage from brokerage closures or mergers and suggest that their findings could be reconciled with those of other studies if analysts prevent firms from over-investment in innovation and if the short-term performance pressure from analysts regarding patenting activities outweighs the benefits from reduced information asymmetry.…”
Section: Quasi-natural Experiments: Brokerage Firm Closures and Mergersmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Derrien and Kecskés () explore the case of a decrease in analyst coverage. The authors hypothesize that a decrease in analyst coverage increases information asymmetry and thus increases the cost of capital; as a result, firms decrease investment and financing.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%