The Real Myth of Coherence

Abstract

In this paper, I offer a novel view of the coherence (or structural) requirements on belief and intention, according to which they are not norms, but rather principles describing how your belief and intention operate. I first argue, on the basis of the unintelligibility of some relevant attitudes-reports, that there are conditions under which you simply do not count as believing or intending unless your beliefs and intentions satisfy the requirements: the conditions under which all of your relevant attitudes are occurrent or activated. I then argue that you are subject to a coherence requirement only if your relevant attitudes are all activated, for you are not necessarily subject to the charge of irrationality in violating a coherence requirement when your attitudes are not all activated. If so, however, you satisfy the coherence requirements whenever you are subject to them, which makes it plausible that the "requirements" should be seen as descriptive principles about belief and intention. This essay develops a novel view of the nature of so-called coherence (or structural) requirements on belief and intention, such as the requirement not to hold contradictory beliefs or intentions, the requirement to believe what follows by modus ponens from what you believe, the requirement to intend what you believe to be a necessary means to the end you intend. I argue that the idea that there are normative requirements of coherence is a myth. In saying this, I mean to contrast 'normative' with 'descriptive'. My view is that the requirements turn out inviolable, once we articulate the conditions under which you are subject to them and reflect on what is involved in believing and intending. They should rather be seen as constitutive principles which describe the ways in which your beliefs and intentions operate under certain conditions, or the conditions under which beliefs and intentions are intelligibly attributed to you. The view consists of two theses. The first is a thesis about what is distinctive to belief and intention: your beliefs and intentions always satisfy the coherence

Imperfection, Accuracy, and Structural Rationality

“…In response to the first question, Worsnip offers a dispositionalist account of coherence tailored to unify the structural requirements of rationality. A similar account of coherence can also be found in Lee (2020). This provides an answer to the Descriptive Question.…”

“…What Is Structural Rationality (or Coherence)? Worsnip (2018a;2018b; and Lee (2020) think that structural rationality is coherence.…”

Two roles for reasons: Cause for divorce?

“…So long as such a restricted version of Non-Akrasia holds, there is no serious threat to my argumentative moves. Lee (2020), for example, argues that local structural requirements of rationality (if there are any) apply only to occurrent attitudes.…”

Structural Rationality and the Property of Coherence

“…debate originated are unclear about the nature of coherence. In section 3, I argue that it is implausible that the concept of coherence in the 1 See, e.g., Lee (2020), Mildenberger (2019), and Worsnip (2018a;2018b;. Fogal (2020) refers to structural rationality and coherence nearly interchangeably.…”