The realist revival in political philosophy, or: Why new is not always improved

Scheuerman, William E.

doi:10.1057/ip.2013.39

“…Theirs are much more philosophically sophisticated analyses which are very clearly attuned to exactly the sort of concerns that have motivated the recent revival of political realism, most notably the complex relationship between ethics and politics, an appreciation of the political as a sphere of human activity that provides order in a context of disagreement but which cannot be reduced to morality, a scepticism towards the power of reason and morality in political life, and the difficulties inherent in judging political action. Bell 2009b;Scheuerman 2013;Sleat 2014;Sleat 2013a). As Scheuerman remarks (2013), however, this lack of awareness may come at the high-cost of unwittingly reproducing the sort of conceptual ambiguities that plagued these earlier contributions, of blindly treading already well worn-paths that lead to intellectual dead-ends, or, and more optimistically, denying themselves access to hard won and potentially fruitful insights or theoretical resources (leading them to reinvent the realist wheel).…”

Section: Conclusion: 'New' Realism?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…But contemporary realism is thoroughly continuous with both the realist tradition generally and some of the specific concerns of IR realism (and, indeed, legal realism). 8 If realism is to go beyond representing a mere anti-moralist gesture then the future research agenda of realist thought should include a certain amount of looking back to previous iterations of political realism both to better understand its own theoretical heritage but also to allow it to draw upon the intellectual resources and lessons (successes and failures) of previous realist thinkers ( see Sabl 2012;Scheuerman 2013;Whelan 2004). And at least part of what we hope to have offered here is a series of reasons for thinking that such an endeavour might be worth undertaking.…”

Section: Conclusion: 'New' Realism?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Realism in Normative Political Theory

Rossi

¹

,

Sleat

²

2014

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This paper provides a critical overview of the realist current in contemporary political philosophy. We define political realism on the basis of its attempt to give varying degrees of autonomy to politics as a sphere of human activity, in large part through its exploration of the sources of normativity appropriate for the political, and so distinguish sharply between political realism and non-ideal theory. We then identify and discuss four key arguments advanced by political realists: from ideology, from the relationship of ethics to politics, from the priority of legitimacy over justice, and from the nature of political judgment. Next, we ask to what extent realism is a methodological approach as opposed to a substantive political position, and so discuss the relationship between realism and a few such positions. We close by pointing out the links between contemporary realism and the realist strand that runs through much of the history of Western political thought.Much contemporary Anglo-American political philosophy operates as a branch of applied ethics: normative political theory is supposed to implement moral commitments external to politics, be they teleological ideals or deontological constraints. However in recent years-under the loose label of 'political realism'-an alternative approach has emerged, or perhaps reemerged (Galston 2010; Runciman 2012). Crudely, realists maintain that political philosophy should not seek to regiment politics through morality; rather, it should theorise about the distinctive forces that shape real politics. Critics of realism see this move as a capitulation of normative theory in favour of descriptive approaches to politics. Realists see it as a way to make political philosophy more relevant and less ideological.This article has two main objectives and as many main sections. First, we propose a working definition of realism, and a critical overview of what we take to be the four key arguments in favour of that position. Second, we explore the status of realist theory: is it best characterised as a series of methodological concerns or does it represent a substantive political position it is own right? In the brief conclusion we discuss to what extent realism is (or could be) a new development rather than a revival of a traditional current of political thinking.

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“…Despite the fact that these scholars dedicated their careers to exploring exactly these issues, and hence have deposited a very rich body of work, contemporary political realists have almost completely shunned any engagement with this classical realism (the only exceptions to this are Bell ; Scheuerman ; Sleat , ). As Scheuerman remarks (), however, this lack of awareness may come at the high cost of unwittingly reproducing the sort of conceptual ambiguities that plagued these earlier contributions, of blindly treading already well‐worn paths that lead to intellectual dead ends, or, more optimistically, denying themselves access to hard won and potentially fruitful insights or theoretical resources (leading them to reinvent the realist wheel).…”

Section: Conclusion: ‘New’ Realism?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“… For some discussion of these continuities, see Bell ; M.C. Williams 2005; Scheuerman ; Sleat , . On legal realism, see Leiter .…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Realism in Normative Political Theory

Rossi

¹

,

Sleat

²

2014

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper provides a critical overview of the realist current in contemporary political philosophy. We define political realism on the basis of its attempt to give varying degrees of autonomy to politics as a sphere of human activity, in large part through its exploration of the sources of normativity appropriate for the political, and so distinguish sharply between political realism and non-ideal theory. We then identify and discuss four key arguments advanced by political realists: from ideology, from the relationship of ethics to politics, from the priority of legitimacy over justice, and from the nature of political judgment. Next, we ask to what extent realism is a methodological approach as opposed to a substantive political position, and so discuss the relationship between realism and a few such positions. We close by pointing out the links between contemporary realism and the realist strand that runs through much of the history of Western political thought.Much contemporary Anglo-American political philosophy operates as a branch of applied ethics: normative political theory is supposed to implement moral commitments external to politics, be they teleological ideals or deontological constraints. However in recent years-under the loose label of 'political realism'-an alternative approach has emerged, or perhaps reemerged (Galston 2010; Runciman 2012). Crudely, realists maintain that political philosophy should not seek to regiment politics through morality; rather, it should theorise about the distinctive forces that shape real politics. Critics of realism see this move as a capitulation of normative theory in favour of descriptive approaches to politics. Realists see it as a way to make political philosophy more relevant and less ideological.This article has two main objectives and as many main sections. First, we propose a working definition of realism, and a critical overview of what we take to be the four key arguments in favour of that position. Second, we explore the status of realist theory: is it best characterised as a series of methodological concerns or does it represent a substantive political position it is own right? In the brief conclusion we discuss to what extent realism is (or could be) a new development rather than a revival of a traditional current of political thinking.

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“…To be sure, that is not sufficient to establish the superiority of realism to moralism, and not even to identify the all-things-considered best form of realism. My aim here is more modest: I want to show that, pace some critics (Erman & Möller, 2015a;Estlund, 2017;Leader-Maynard & Worsnip, 2018;Scheuerman, 2013), contemporary realism is a distinctive and consistent position in normative political theory, and that at least one of its variants does not suffer from a status quo bias-rather, it is as radical as it gets.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%