The Rebel's Dilemma

Lichbach, Mark Irving

doi:10.3998/mpub.13970

Cited by 522 publications

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“…Without resources and organization, anger alone can do little to challenge powerful defenders of the status quo (Tilly 1978). Moreover, since Olson's classic treatment of the free-rider problem, we know that collective action cannot be taken for granted, especially where the costs incurred by volunteering individuals may be high (Lichbach 1995). However, there are good reasons to believe that the collective-action dilemma may have been overstated in the context of civil wars.…”

Section: From Grievances To Collective Actionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Horizontal Inequalities and Ethnonationalist Civil War: A Global Comparison

2011

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Section: From Grievances To Collective Actionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Horizontal Inequalities and Ethnonationalist Civil War: A Global Comparison

2011

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“…Moreover, since regimes with high repressive capacity should be better able to deter conflict (e.g. Lichbach, 1995;Tullock, 1971), some researchers have argued the relationship between degree of democracy and the risk of conflict will be non-linear and non-monotonic, owing to the countervailing influences of declining repressiveness and greater opportunities for nonviolent political avenues. More specifically, the relationship between degree of democracy and risk of conflict should take the shape of an inverted-U, with the greatest risk of violence among semidemocratic countries that combine insufficient repressiveness to deter violence and insufficient political openness to induce substitution to nonviolent activities (see e.g.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Chwe, 1999;Opp, Voss & Gern, 1995), or the potential role of innovative entrepreneurs or organizers that help overcome previous obstacles (e.g. Lichbach, 1995).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Political opportunity structures, democracy, and civil war

Gleditsch

Ruggeri

2010

Journal of Peace Research

165

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Theories of mobilization suggest that groups are more likely to resort to violence in the presence of political opportunity structures that afford greater prospects for extracting concessions from the government or better opportunities to topple ruling governments. However, existing efforts to consider the possible influences of political opportunity structures on incentives for violence and civil war empirically have almost invariably relied upon measures of democracy to proxy for the hypothesized mechanisms, most notably the argument that the opposing effects of political accommodation and repression will give rise to an inverted U-shaped relationship between democracy and the risk of civil war. The authors detail a number of problems with measures of democracy as proxies for political opportunity structures and develop alternative measures based on the likely risks that political leaders will lose power in irregular challenges and their implications for the incentives for resort to violence. The authors evaluate empirically how the security with which leaders hold office influences the prospects of violent civil conflict. The findings indicate that recent irregular leader entry and transitions indeed increase the risk of conflict onset, while democratic institutions are found to decrease the risk of civil war, after controlling for the new measures of state weakness.

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“…Thus, by mobilizing people through framing efforts, the organization is able to provide participants with resources that enable participation. The gist is that people cannot participate without the means to do so (Lichbach, 1995). Therefore, soldiers must be equipped and given access to the means to allow their participation.…”

Section: Prospect Theory and Rebellious Choicesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Support and Nonsupport for Nationalist Rebellion: A Prospect Theory Approach

Masters

2004

Political Psychology

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Prospect theory has been advanced as one way to link intentional rebellious action and the influence of social conditions on individual decisions to support such action. This study extends the application of prospect theory by explaining tendencies toward action or inaction among individuals within identical social contexts. Put simply, the way in which people define reference points has an effect on how they perceive violent options. These perceptions may invoke inaction biases among members of a constituent community. This explanation is explored with illustrative examples drawn from interviews with individuals who supported or did not support rebellious action in Northern Ireland (in 1998) and in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (in 1999). The interview data suggest that territorial demands are an important factor in how rebellious options are perceived.KEY WORDS: prospect theory, collective action, ethnonational rebellion, territoriality Students of political behavior in general, and of violent behavior specifically, must at some point address the issue of participation versus nonparticipation. Participants in violent action engage in, or threaten, coercion for political ends. The costs of participation tend to be very high; the benefit of such action is a simple public good shared equally by all, regardless of whether they participate. As such, the tendency to free-ride on the efforts of others is strong, hence few participants seek the public good. However, to acquire the public good often requires that many people participate. Thus, the task facing rebels is to overcome free riding in order to acquire the public good.In Mark Irving Lichbach's The Rebel 's Dilemma (1995), the author identifies a series of solutions to the free-rider problem, all centering on how to alter costbenefit analysis in order to mobilize potential participants. One solution is referred to as "changing the type of public good" or "seeking public bads" (Lichbach, 1995, p. 107). In basic form, the solution suggests: "The initial task of the revo-

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The Rebel's Dilemma

Cited by 522 publications

References 0 publications

Horizontal Inequalities and Ethnonationalist Civil War: A Global Comparison

Horizontal Inequalities and Ethnonationalist Civil War: A Global Comparison

Political opportunity structures, democracy, and civil war

Support and Nonsupport for Nationalist Rebellion: A Prospect Theory Approach

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