The referential-attributive distinction

Abstract

In this paper my aim is to approach the referential-attributive distinction in the interpretation of definite descriptions, originally discussed by Donnellan (1966), from a cognitive perspective grounded in Sperber and Wilson's Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson 1986/95). In particular, I argue that definite descriptions encode a procedural semantics, in the sense of Blakemore (1987), which is neutral as between referential and attributive readings (among others). On this account, the distinction between referential and attributive readings arises as a result of the differing links that exist between different types of mental representation and the world, rather than as a result of the differing links between language and mental representations.

On the Social Practice of Indirect Reports

“…Many authors have written on Relevance Theory, most notably Carston (2002), Bezuidenhout (1997), Rouchota (1992), Powell (2001), and Capone (2008; the latter article argues from a more philosophical perspective, which is what I am primarily interested in here). The main idea that emerges from these writings is that pragmatics provides full propositions on the basis of the fragmentary ones provided by semantics.…”

Quantifiers and Referential Use

“…17 The data thus suggest that, if explainable within a Gricean framework at all, the standard, frequent kind of referential uses of quantifier phrases must be explained 16 As noted above, this reaction has been bolstered by Devitt's and Reimer's consideration involving "dead metaphors", which suggests to them that pragmatic theories must take on the burden of showing that a pragmatic explanation of referential use is not merely possible but necessary. As we saw, they think this because in dead metaphors a pragmatic explanation is possible (at least for some speakers) but clearly not necessary because incorrect.…”

“…Suppose first that every egg in the carton we are looking at is evidently broken. If I then make an utterance of (17) intending to communicate to my wife that the eggs e1, e2, e3, e4, e5 and e6 (as we may call them) are broken, I will surely be successful in doing so. This utterance contains a referential use of "every egg".…”

“…In François Recanati [18,19] the relevant aspect appears to be simply an intention on the part of the utterer, namely the intention whether to use the relevant description referentially or attributively. In Anne Bezuidenhout [3] and George Powell [17], the relevant aspect seems to be a more complex cluster of things, which includes speaker intentions that the audience grasp the relevance to utterance interpretation of some favored "mode of presentation" or "individual concept"; this may be quite general and inspecific (in attributive uses) or quite particular and specific (in referential uses).…”

“…In fact, to some the differences may even immediately suggest the inadequacy of ambiguity explanations of referential uses. 17 Bach ([2], 227) sees standard referential uses of descriptions as explainable by the mechanism of generalized conversational implicatures. Neale ([16], 173) says in passing that his account in [15] (of the nonstandard uses) is "a generalized conversational implicature story".…”