The reflection of competition and coordination on organic agribusiness supply chains

Nematollahi, Mohammadreza; Tajbakhsh, Alireza; Sedghy, Bahareh Mosadegh

doi:10.1016/j.tre.2021.102462

Cited by 35 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 95 publications

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“…Li and Zhu (2020) used a wholesale price and cost-sharing agreement to coordinate a GFSC in the information asymmetric background. Tajbakhsh et al . (2021) discussed the application of a synergistic trilateral contract in a competition organic food supply chain.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Investment strategies and coordination for green food supply chain: a further research considering the inputs of the blockchain-based traceability system

Liu

2023

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PurposeTo study these issues, the authors chose a GFSC with one producer and one material supplier as research object, the supplier will offer green material to the producer and the producer will make green food using green production technology. Then, the authors proposed that consumers' perceived value was determined by the trustworthiness levels of the related green and quality-safety information provided by the supplier and the producer. Then, considering the trustworthiness levels of the green and quality information provided by the supplier and the producer, the authors improved the demand function. Afterwards, we constructed four investment models and their income models are built and then a cost-sharing and revenue-sharing contract (hereafter, CSRS) was adopted to coordinate the GFSC.Design/methodology/approachWith the growth of consumers environmental awareness and life level, consumers' requirements for green and high quality food are growing. In recently years, to increase consumers' perceived trustworthiness on the product greenness and quality levels, stakeholders in green food supply chain (hereafter, GFSC) start to adopt the blockchain-based traceability system (hereafter, BLTS). For investors, they need to know the investment conditions and how to coordinate the GFSC.Findings(1) When the revenue-sharing coefficient is less than three-fourths and higher then a certain vaule, the cost-sharing and revenue-sharing contract can make the GFSC coordinate. (2) The investment cost threshold of the BLTS has a positive relationship with the trustworthiness improvement levels of the green and quality information, the green degree of food products and the quality of food products. (3) In the proposed four investment situations, as the growth of consumers perceived credibility coefficient about the greenness information and the quality information, chain members' revenues will increase. In addition, comparing with co-investing the BLTS, benefits of chain members are lower than them in the sole investment model.Originality/value(1) The demand function we proposed can help chain members forecast market demand to support production or ordering decisions. (2) The investment decision policies can offer a theoretical reference for chain members to use the BLTS. (3) The CSRS will offer the theoretical reference for coordinating the supply chain after using the BLTS. Furthermore, our study method can be referenced by other scholars. (4) The study method can offer a method reference for researchers who do a similar discussion in a manufacturing supply chain. Although, our research cannot guide the industrial practices, it can serve as a reference of the similar research in industry.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Investment strategies and coordination for green food supply chain: a further research considering the inputs of the blockchain-based traceability system

Liu

2023

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“…Our work is also related to the growing literature on cooperation between firms. Many studies focused on vertical cooperation between supply chain members in forward supply chains (e.g., Cachon & Lariviere, 2005; Liu et al, 2020, 2022; Nematollahi et al, 2017, 2021; Tavana et al, 2020) or reverse/closed‐loop supply chains (e.g., Choi et al, 2013; Hosseini‐Motlagh et al, 2019, 2022; Sarkar & Bhala, 2021; Zheng et al, 2019). We also consider vertical cooperation in the supply chain context, but we focus more on horizontal cooperation between two independent manufacturers facing a dominant retailer.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal joint trade‐in rebate strategies in a retailer‐led supply chain

Tang

Ding

2022

Manage Decis Econ

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This study investigates the joint trade-in rebate strategies in a supply chain with independent manufacturers selling substitutable products via a dominant retailer. We model their interplay as a Stackelberg game and analyze their joint trade-in rebate decisions. We find that the differentiated trade-in rebate scheme is better for the retailer, and the manufacturers cooperating in making their trade-in rebate decisions can achieve win-win results in most cases. However, replacement consumers could benefit from the retailer's uniform trade-in rebate scheme and the manufacturers not cooperating in their trade-in decisions. The latter is always more beneficial to the environment. | INTRODUCTIONTrade-in programs are extensively used in durable product markets, such as household electrical appliances, automobiles, electronics, and technology industries (Agrawal et al., 2016;Ray et al., 2005). In a trade-in program, trade-in rebates are commonly regarded as a special discount firms offer to the replacement consumers for a new product.Consequently, trade-in programs can serve as essential strategic leverage to boost sales of new products (Xiao, 2017). For instance, in highly saturated markets such as refrigerators or electric heaters, the percentage of replacement purchases in the United States equals 70%-80% of annual sales (Ray et al., 2005). Similarly, approximately 57% of all new car sales are through trade-ins in the automobile industry (Zhu et al., 2008). It has been revealed that trade-ins play a crucial role in increasing the purchasing frequency (Desai et al., 2016), helping firms to remain competitive (Li & Xu, 2015), and reducing the environmental impact (Vedantam et al., 2021).

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“…When it comes to chain-to-chain competition, a considerable number of papers have studied the effects of price and/or quality competition (Jafarian et al, 2019;Wang et al, 2020;Nematollahi et al, 2021). Hafezalkotob (2015) incorporates government policies into the competition between the green and regular supply chains.…”

Section: Chain-to-chain Competitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Channel structure and evolutionary stability analysis between traditional and green service supply chains

Wang

2022

Soft Comput

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This paper aims to explore the long-term Evolutionary Stability Strategy (ESS) of vertical channel structure strategic interaction between Traditional and Green Service Supply Chains (TSSC and GSSC) and figure out the optimal pricing and green service decisions. Considering that two types of supply chains could choose between centralized (C) and decentralized channel structures (D), we first establish four channel structure models based on optimization theory, namely, Models DD, DC, CD, and CC. Wherein Model DD(CC) means that two supply chains adopt the channel structure D(C) simultaneously and Model DC(CD) refers to GSSC adopting the channel structure D(C) while TSSC using the channel structure C(D). Further, we develop an evolutionary game to discuss the ESSs of the dynamic competitive system under different market environment. The research results show that the stronger the integration between upstream and downstream firms of GSSC is, the supply chain would more likely provide higher green service when the TSSC has a decentralized channel structure.Moreover, when the competition between two supply chains is sufficiently low, only point (0,0) is the ESS; when it is moderate, there are two ESSs, i.e., ESS (0,0) and ESS (1,1); when it is very high, only point (1,1) is the ESS. Numerical studies are conducted to examine the effects of competition coefficient on prices, demands and profits, as well as the roles of initial states of two supply chains' channel strategies on their ESSs.

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The reflection of competition and coordination on organic agribusiness supply chains

Cited by 35 publications

References 95 publications

Investment strategies and coordination for green food supply chain: a further research considering the inputs of the blockchain-based traceability system

Investment strategies and coordination for green food supply chain: a further research considering the inputs of the blockchain-based traceability system

Optimal joint trade‐in rebate strategies in a retailer‐led supply chain

Channel structure and evolutionary stability analysis between traditional and green service supply chains

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