The region that isn't: China, Russia and the failure of regional integration in Central Asia

Abstract

The failure of regionalism in Central Asia is a puzzle. Whereas almost all world regions have seen a rise of regional organisations since the end of the Cold War, attempts to establish durable regional cooperation among Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan proofed unsuccessful. Although some of the Central Asian countries participate in wider regional organisations like the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), the genuine Central Asian Cooperation Organisation (CACO) was dissolved in 2005. Given the cultural, economic and political similarities between the five Central Asian countries, this lack of a regional organisation is surprising. In contrast to previous work, this paper argues that the failure of regionalism in Central Asia is not so much due to domestic political factors, but more to the extra-regional economic dependence of the regional economies and the impact of external powers within Central Asia. Challenged by the rise of China, Russia uses the EAEU in order to preserve its hegemonic influence over the former Soviet Republics. By joining the Russian dominated EAEU, Central Asia's regional power Kazakhstan enjoys economic benefits which outweigh the potential gains of Central Asian cooperation within CACO by far. Consequently, Kazakhstan follows its extra-regional interests in closer cooperation with Russia at the cost of regional cooperation with its Central Asian neighbours. As a result, the Central Asian countries are unable to build up a unified regional block in relation to extra-regional powers like China or Russia.

The Strategy of the Eurasian Economic Union Extra-Regional Integration

“…Wooster, Tepa and Smile define extra-regional trade as trade between the organisation and non-member countries [13], in contrast to intra-regional trade among its member states. Such complex interdependences between extra-regional integration and intra-regional cooperation have been widely described by Krapohl and Vasileva-Dienes [14] and Czerewacz-Filipowicz and Konopelko [15].…”

China’s engagement with Kazakhstan and Russia’s Zugzwang: Why is Nur-Sultan incurring regional power hedging?

“…Since it gained independence in 1991, Kazakhstan has maintained a balancing position between two regional powers, thus having adopted a multi-vectoral political agenda as an engagement stratagem. However, the multi-vector foreign policy is largely dependent on how Russia, China and also the United States design their respective relationships—a constellation referred to as the “Second Great Game” (Krapohl & Vasileva-Dienes, 2019). Therefore, a constant recalibration of the Kazakh government to the fluctuant changes is required to maintain the balance amid the geopolitical competition, to control the pivot area of power projection in the Eurasian rim-lands (Harper, 2017; Sullivan, 2019, p. 36).…”

“…Considering Beijing’s increasing demand for oil and gas to satiate the domestic market, the China–Kazakhstan pipeline currently accounts for approximately 15% of the entire volume of oil exports, which is likely to grow in the future and, thus, indicates increasing Chinese leverage. Therefore, Nur-Sultan maintains its multi-vector foreign policy, which involves a hedging position between China, Russia and—to a lesser extent—the West (Kembayev, 2018; Krapohl & Vasileva-Dienes, 2019; Orazgaliyev, 2017).…”

Polityka zagraniczna Rosji. Determinanty, interesy i środki

“…Do 2010 roku Chiny stały się największym inwestorem w państwach poradzieckich Azji Środkowej i bez wątpienia można podkreślić, że już od dłuższego czasu Chiny skutecznie wypierają Rosję ze środkowoazjatyckiej przestrzeni gospodarczej 47 . Od kilku lat wielkość handlu pomiędzy Uzbekistanem i Chinami 48 czy pomiędzy Kirgistanem a Chinami 49 jest większa niż pomiędzy Rosją a tymi dwoma wymienionymi państwami Azji Środkowej 50 .…”