The Regulation of Environmental Innovations

A Dynamic Approach to the Environmental Effects of Trade Liberalization

“…Solving (28) together with (1), yields the stable steady state equilibrium point in (20). where OLBT denotes the open-loop equilibrium at bilateral trade.…”

“…Livernois (1992, 1994), Long (1998, 2002) and Tsur and Zemel (2008). 3 To this regard, see Downing and White (1986), Milliman and Prince (1989), Damania (1996), Chiou and Hu (2001) and Tsur and Zemel (2002), Dragone et al (2009). determine the extent of tax amount for various quantities of negative externality to which social welfare coincides with market equilibrium.…”

Regulating Environmental Externalities through Public Firms: A Differential Game

“…A relatively large subset of the existing contributions examines the existence and features of Pigouvian taxation aimed at reducing pollution, both in monopoly and oligopoly regimes (see Bergstrom et al, 1987;Livernois, 1992, 1994;Long, 1998, 2002;and Tsur and Zemel, 2008, inter alia). Indirectly, Pigouvian taxation is also considered as a means for generating incentives towards R&D investments in environmental-friendly technologies (to this regard, see Downing and White, 1986;Milliman and Prince, 1989;Damania, 1996;Chiou and Hu, 2001; and Tsur and Zemel, 2002, inter alia). The established approach common to all of these studies consists in outlining the social optimum, where a benevolent planner chooses a production plan for the firms in the industry so as to maximise social welfare, as a benchmark against which the performance of the profit-seeking firms has to be assessed.…”

Subsidizing Technological Innovations in the Presence of R&D Spillovers

“…Biglaiser and Horowitz (1995) consider binary choices whether to undertake research into a technology that reduces the emission intensity of production. In Tsur and Zemel (2002), a regulator auctions the procurement of an environmental project to an individual firm, and conditions transfers to this firm on the project completion time.…”