The Regulatory Gift: Politics, regulation and governance

Abstract

This article introduces the “regulatory gift” as a conceptual framework for understanding a particular form of government‐led deregulation that is presented as central to the public interest. Contra to theories of regulatory capture, government corruption, “insider” personal interest, or profit‐seeking theories of regulation, the regulatory gift describes reform that is overtly designed by government to reduce or reorient regulators’ functions to the advantage of the regulated and in line with market objectives on a potentially macro (rather than industry‐specific) scale. As a conceptual framework, the regulatory gift is intended to be applicable across regulated sectors of democratic states and in this article the empirical sections evidence the practice of regulatory gifting in contemporary United Kingdom (UK) politics. Specifically, this article analyses the 2011 UK Public Bodies Act, affecting some 900 regulatory public bodies and its correlative legislation, the 2014 Regulator's Code, the 2015 Deregulation Act, and the 2016 Enterprise Bill. The article concludes that while in some cases the regulatory gift may be aligned with the public interest – delivering on cost reduction, enhancing efficiency, and stimulating innovation – this will not always be the case. As the case study of the regulatory body, the UK Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, demonstrates, despite the explicit claims made by legislators, the regulatory gift has the potential to significantly undermine the public interest.

Protecting the interests of a retail investor i n the United States, China and Russia: the example of brokerage

“…Метод анализа кейсов лежит в основе работ следующих авторов: C. Dunlop и др., Overdevest C., Zeitlin J., Browne J., Stellinga B., Mügge D., Mennillo G., Roy S., Baker A. (Dunlop et al, 2012;Overdevest & Zeitlin, 2014;Browne, 2020;Stellinga & Mügge, 2017;Mennillo & Roy, 2014;Baker, 2010Baker, , 2018.…”

The political economy of Australian regulatory reform

“…Many theories have been proposed to explain why regulations emerge. Regulations might serve the public interest by correcting market failures (Pigou, 1932), they might be the product of trades between rent seekers and governments (McChensey, 1987; Peltzman, 1976; Stigler, 1971), they might be a ‘regulatory gift’ from the government (Browne, 2018), or they could emerge as an institutional response to competing social costs faced by society (Djankov, Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez‐de‐Silanes, & Shleifer, 2003; Shleifer, 2005). Despite the complex origins of regulation, it is now widely understood that regulations accumulate over time – that is, there is a tendency for the regulatory state to expand.…”

National and energy security in terms of human development

“…In the same time, phenomenon of resources course exists, with evidence that resource dependence negatively affects growth remains convincing (Badeeb, Lean and Clark, 2017). Numerous policies in this field are developed so far, but despite the explicit claims made by legislators, the regulatory gift has the potential to significantly undermine the public interest (Browne, 2018). It is also important to underline power of national governments in regulating this area, because market actors usually have no significant impact on decisionmaking process (Lederer, 2012).…”