The reintegration of ex-combatants and post-conflict violence. An analysis of municipal crime levels in Colombia

Abstract

Violent crime in Colombia is analyzed following the demobilization of ex-combatants using municipal-level data. The main findings are that an increased presence of ex-combatants does not systematically increase homicides, but may increase robberies. Reintegration programs are shown to matter. Former paramilitaries who are not in a reintegration program increase crime. Former guerillas increase robberies, regardless of whether they are in or out of reintegration, but homicides decrease for guerrillas in reintegration. Ex-combatants often settle in municipalities with more crime. Controlling for reverse causality, ex-combatants only increase crime if they are not in reintegration, while in reintegration they may reduce crime.

Insecurity and the reintegration of former armed non-state actors in Colombia

“…Individuals, who reside in communities where threats to their physical integrity are frequent and where they are incapable of moving about the community like an average person, will be substantially challenged in finding employment, protecting their family, or even going to the grocery store. Where previous research has found the impact of violence to be weak (Kaplan and Nussio (2018a, b), we suggest, as do others, that the security context in the ANSAs' area of resettlement can be a critical factor in their ability to complete the Colombian government's reintegration program (Nussio and Howe, 2016;Peña and Dorussen, 2021). Second, we propose that security threats are multifaceted, especially in the context of the areas in which ANSAs resettle.…”

“…Theory Previous research has found some indication that violence and insecurity influence the effectiveness of reintegration programs, but the evidence has been inconsistent and often researchers find that other factors are more influential in shaping outcomes (Nussio and Howe, 2016;Kaplan and Nussio, 2018a, b;Peña and Dorussen, 2021). We neither dispute these findings nor question the research methodologies that lead to these conclusions.…”

“…Several authors find that security is not especially predictive of reintegration success (Kaplan and Nussio (2018a, b). Some scholars have found that ex-combatants are more likely to settle in more dangerous areas (Peña and Dorussen, 2021), while others find that the more general security situation in the ANSAs' region of residence is critical (Nussio and Howe, 2016). We contend that by incorporating municipal-level data on conflict and criminal violence into our database of over 50,000 former combatants and their gender, social, and family situation, we will be able to arrive at more conclusive answers as to why some individuals are able to complete a reintegration program, while other fail or drop out.…”

“…Since many ANSAs return to their home regions when they are able, if they are returning to communities that exhibit many of the same indicators of violence that initially pushed these individuals toward taking up arms, they may face significant challenges. Even if these home communities are the site of family and friends, they may still exhibit the hallmarks of unstable and war-afflicted regions (Peña and Dorussen, 2021).…”

Violent Conflicts in South America

“…While in Colombia the homicide rates declined after the Peace Accord, 130 demobilized FARC-EP combatants, and 300 social leaders were killed (Pearce 2020, p. 8). In an in-depth analysis conducted by Peña and Dorussen (2020) into the links between reintegration programs of former combatants and crime rates, they found that "the presence of former paramilitaries [mostly AUC members] who are not in a reintegration program is linked with increased homicide and robbery rates," while "former guerillas, regardless of whether they are in or out of a reintegration program, are associated with increased robberies, but when they are in reintegration, guerrillas are associated with fewer homicides" (Peña and Dorussen 2020, p. 18).…”