The Relation of History of Science to Philosophy of Science in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and Kuhn's later philosophical work

Kindi, Vasso

doi:10.1162/106361405775466117

Cited by 25 publications

(9 citation statements)

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“…4 4 This is no coincidence, since both were influenced by Wittgenstein. See Preston 1997 and Kindi 2006. …”

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confidence: 99%

Relativism, Commensurability and Translatability

Glock

2007

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This paper discusses conceptual relativism. The main focus is on the contrasting ideas of Wittgenstein and Davidson, with Quine, Kuhn, Feyerabend and Hacker in supporting roles. I distinguish conceptual from alethic and ontological relativism, defend a distinction between conceptual scheme and empirical content, and reject the Davidsonian argument against the possibility of alternative conceptual schemes: there can be conceptual diversity without failure of translation, and failure of translation is not necessarily incompatible with recognizing a practice as linguistic. Conceptual relativism may be untenable, but not for the hermeneutic reasons espoused by Davidson.

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“…4 4 This is no coincidence, since both were influenced by Wittgenstein. See Preston 1997 and Kindi 2006. …”

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confidence: 99%

Relativism, Commensurability and Translatability

Glock

2007

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“…Kuhn's approach, for this, should not be understood as an empirical description of science. According to Kindi (2005), Kuhn's project would be a transcendental one, stipulating the conditions of possibility of science, and, therefore, it would not rely on history. Mladenović (2007) understands Kuhn's project as offering a sort of Weberian explanatory theory, in order to replace the image bequeathed by the received view; the categories in Structure should not be taken as implicated by the history of science, but as explanatory tools used with the goal of understanding "scientific change without attempting to describe it in detail" (p. 273).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

From Empirical Evidence to First Principles

Pirozelli

2020

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The Structure of Scientific Revolutions represented a milestone in the attempt to understand scientific development based on empirical observations. However, in the next decades after the publication of his book, history, psychology, and sociology became increasingly marginal in Kuhn’s discussions. In his last articles, Kuhn even suggested that philosophers should pay less attention to empirical data and focus more on “first principles.” The purpose of this article is, first, to describe this radical transformation in Kuhn’s methodological approach, from his initial naturalism to his later and more strict philosophical stance. Next, I present some of the alleged justifications for explaining this transition, such as his interest in problems more firmly attached to the philosophical tradition and a desire for greater acceptance within this community. Although these factors certainly played a role in explaining Kuhn’s change, I also believe that an important theoretical component exerts a fundamental function in this transition: the idea that scientific development is a kind of evolutionary process, which is better understood through the use of abstract theoretical models, instead of sparse observations of scientific activity.

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“…[24] A transcendental reading of Kuhn's work, which differs, however, from Friedman's, is also proposed in Kindi (2005). This account does not attribute to Kuhn Friedman's aspiration to vindicate transcendentally the rationality of scientific progress, but rather, explains how the use of history may bring forward the diverse conditions in the history of science that have made, and make, science as a practice possible.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Challenge of Scientific Revolutions: Van Fraassen's and Friedman's Responses

Kindi¹

2011

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science

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This article criticizes the attempts by Bas van Fraassen and Michael Friedman to address the challenge to rationality posed by the Kuhnian analysis of scientific revolutions. In the paper, I argue that van Fraassen's solution, which invokes a Sartrean theory of emotions to account for radical change, does not amount to justifying rationally the advancement of science but, rather, despite his protestations to the contrary, is an explanation of how change is effected. Friedman's approach, which appeals to philosophical developments at a meta-theoretical level, does not really address the problem of rationality as posed by Kuhn's work. Instead of showing how, despite revolutions, scientific development is, indeed, rational, he gives a transcendental account of rational scientific progress.

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The Relation of History of Science to Philosophy of Science in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and Kuhn's later philosophical work

Cited by 25 publications

References 10 publications

Relativism, Commensurability and Translatability

Relativism, Commensurability and Translatability

From Empirical Evidence to First Principles

The Challenge of Scientific Revolutions: Van Fraassen's and Friedman's Responses

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