The Relationship among Government, Enterprise, and Public in Environmental Governance from the Perspective of Multi-Player Evolutionary Game

Chen, Yingxin; Zhang, Jing; Tadikamalla, Pandu R.; Gao, Xutong

doi:10.3390/ijerph16183351

Cited by 65 publications

(52 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…After a single game, the subject would not withdraw from the social group. Therefore, the heterogeneous subjects would, in the process of the game, continue to learn, try, and make mistakes instead of making one-time choice [40], find the optimal strategy under the influence of social network structure, and then form the inherent evolutionary pattern of the diffusion of decision-making. We used the small-world network structure in a complex network to metaphorize a social network in which relatives and friends exchange information in a social environment [41,42].…”

Section: Evacuate Staymentioning

confidence: 99%

Evacuate or Stay? A Typhoon Evacuation Decision Model in China Based on the Evolutionary Game Theory in Complex Networks

Sun

Zhang

2020

IJERPH

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The Chinese Government has played an important role in organizing the evacuation of typhoon disasters, and in-depth analysis of individual behavioral decisions is a prerequisite for adopting an effective emergency organization plan. Existing evacuation plans only consider how the Government issues the early warning and organizes the mandatory evacuation, but does not formulate effective policies to improve the efficiency of self-evacuation of evacuees and lacks the understanding of individual evacuation decision-making. Using game-based theory in a small-world network context, we build an evolutionary game model of evacuation decision diffusion between evacuees in the context of a complex network. The model simulates the effects of guaranteeing the evacuation order and providing material supplies on the evacuation decision diffusion in a small-world network in China. The results showed that various levels of policy-implementation led to different rates of evacuation. As the cost-reduction of the evacuation process increased, the evacuation response rate in the social system increased. In contrast, as the rate of reducing the non-evacuation cost decreased or the cost-reduction rate of non-evacuation increased, the evacuation response rate in the social system decreased. The study findings provided insights on emergency planning and the effectiveness of their implementation in social networks, which can be used to improve evacuation policy.

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Section: Evacuate Staymentioning

confidence: 99%

Evacuate or Stay? A Typhoon Evacuation Decision Model in China Based on the Evolutionary Game Theory in Complex Networks

Sun

Zhang

2020

IJERPH

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“…Ruiz-Villaverde et al [34] identified several advantages of public and stakeholder participation in water management, such as the better use of knowledge and experiences from different stakeholders, increases in public acceptance, and reduced litigation, delays, and inefficiencies in implementation. Chen et al [35] pointed out that government supervision has a positive effect on environmental governance and can urge enterprises to actively perform pollution control. The effect of government supervision is constrained by the income and costs of enterprises, and the penalties for passive pollution control should be raised.…”

Section: Public Participation In Natural Hazard Emergency Reliefmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on the Construction of a Natural Hazard Emergency Relief Alliance Based on the Public Participation Degree

et al. 2020

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At present, in light of new situations and the new task of natural hazard response, effective public participation in emergency relief has become an urgent task that can reduce economic losses and casualties. The purpose of this paper is to construct a natural hazard emergency relief alliance and analyze the mechanisms and dynamics of public participation. In this study, methods based on a multi-agent system were adopted, and we used different participants as heterogeneous agents with different attitudes and resources. Using four different processes, namely participation proposals, negotiation interval, negotiation decision-making function, and participation strategy, we comprehensively construct an emergency relief alliance for natural hazards. In addition, the dynamic public interaction process is analyzed and a construction algorithm is given. The experimental results show that the proposed method has better performance in alliance formation efficiency, negotiation efficiency, and agent utility. The research results illustrate that the public’s attitudes and resources influence the construction of emergency relief alliances; a greater degree of public participation contributes to a more efficient alliance formation. The findings of this study contribute to the promotion of public cooperation and improvement in the efficiency of natural hazard emergency relief.

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“…Lan et al used evolutionary game theory to investigate the various factors which influence the strategy selection of the parties in school sports injury accidents [ 42 ]. Chen et al discussed the interaction and influencing factors among enterprise pollution control, government supervision and public participation [ 43 ]. Moreover, evolutionary game theory is also used in the treatment and diagnosis of diseases.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Factors Influencing Private Hospitals’ Participation in the Innovation of Biomedical Engineering Industry: A Perspective of Evolutionary Game Theory

Liu

Yang

2020

IJERPH

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The innovation of the biomedical engineering (BME) industry is inseparable from its cooperation with medical institutions. China has considerable medical institutions. Although private hospitals account for more than half of Chinese medical institutions, they rarely participate in biomedical engineering industry innovation. This paper analyzed the collaborative relationship among biomedical engineering enterprises, universities, research institutes, public hospitals and private hospitals through evolutionary game theory and discussed the influence of different factors on the collaborative innovation among them. A tripartite evolutionary game model is established which regards private hospitals as a stakeholder. The results show that (1) the good credit of private hospitals has a positive effect on their participation in collaborative innovation; (2) it is helpful for BME collaborative innovation to enhance the collaborative innovation ability of partners; (3) the novelty of innovation projects has an impact on BME collaborative innovation. The specific impacts depend on the revenue, cost and risk allocation ratio of innovation partners; (4) the higher the practicability of innovation projects, the more conducive to collaborative innovation.

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The Relationship among Government, Enterprise, and Public in Environmental Governance from the Perspective of Multi-Player Evolutionary Game

Cited by 65 publications

References 32 publications

Evacuate or Stay? A Typhoon Evacuation Decision Model in China Based on the Evolutionary Game Theory in Complex Networks

Evacuate or Stay? A Typhoon Evacuation Decision Model in China Based on the Evolutionary Game Theory in Complex Networks

Research on the Construction of a Natural Hazard Emergency Relief Alliance Based on the Public Participation Degree

Factors Influencing Private Hospitals’ Participation in the Innovation of Biomedical Engineering Industry: A Perspective of Evolutionary Game Theory

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