The relationship between attention and consciousness: an expanded taxonomy and implications for ‘no-report’ paradigms

Abstract

Tensions between global neuronal workspace theory and recurrent processing theory have sparked much debate in the field of consciousness research. Here, we focus on one of the key distinctions between these theories: the proposed relationship between attention and consciousness. By reviewing recent empirical evidence, we argue that both theories contain key insights and that certain aspects of each theory can be reconciled into a novel framework that may help guide future research. Alternative theories are also considered, including attended intermediate-level representations theory, integrated information theory and higher order thought theory. With the aim of offering a fresh and nuanced perspective to current theoretical debates, an updated taxonomy of conscious and non-conscious states is proposed. This framework maps a wider spectrum of conscious states by incorporating contemporary views from cognitive neuroscience regarding the variety of attentional mechanisms that are known to interact with sensory processing. Whether certain types of attention are necessary for phenomenal and access consciousness is considered and incorporated into this extended taxonomy. To navigate this expanded space, we review recent 'no-report' paradigms and address several methodological misunderstandings in order to pave a clear path forward for identifying the neural basis of perceptual awareness.This article is part of the theme issue 'Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access'.

Conscious Processing and the Global Neuronal Workspace Hypothesis

“…Most importantly, only the N2 remains under conditions where the stimuli are task-irrelevant, yet reported to be consciously perceived (Pitts et al, 2012;Pitts et al, 2014). The (unresolved) controversy surrounds the issue of whether one can ascertain that such stimuli are truly seen, as opposed to being merely potentially visible but unattended: intermediate-latency sustained negativities may reflect a neural state of information accessibility, while the P3 would reflect genuine conscious access and processing (for discussion, see (Pitts et al, 2018).…”

Differential Effects of Awareness and Task Relevance on Early and Late ERPs in a No-Report Visual Oddball Paradigm

“…Inattentional blindness (IB) coupled with task manipulations can help disentangle these factors (Mack, 2003;Pitts et al, 2012;Shafto and Pitts, 2015). In addition to being highly ecologically valid, the IB design of Pitts et al (2018) circumvents the need for trial-by-trial subjective reports. The confound of subjective report with conscious perception is a caveat often encountered in consciousness research (Aru et al, 2012;Frässle et al, 2014;Tsuchiya et al, 2015;Pitts et al, 2018).…”

“…In addition to being highly ecologically valid, the IB design of Pitts et al (2018) circumvents the need for trial-by-trial subjective reports. The confound of subjective report with conscious perception is a caveat often encountered in consciousness research (Aru et al, 2012;Frässle et al, 2014;Tsuchiya et al, 2015;Pitts et al, 2018). As a result, brain activity related to awareness might be confused with brain activity related to the report (Pitts et al, 2014;Tsuchiya et al, 2015).…”

Recent evidence that attention is necessary, but not sufficient, for conscious perception

“…Recently, the claim that attention and awareness are doubly dissociable has fallen out of favor. The current leading consensus is a single dissociation view: attention is necessary, but not sufficient, for conscious awareness . This viewpoint took hold as evidence accumulated that even if conscious perception can be shown in the absence of certain forms of attention, other forms of attention may be active—the result that may have been predicted given the understanding of attention as a heterogeneous phenomenon that potentially includes many different neural mechanisms and processes.…”

“…The current leading consensus is a single dissociation view: attention is necessary, but not sufficient, for conscious awareness. 23 This viewpoint took hold as evidence accumulated that even if conscious perception can be shown in the absence of certain forms of attention, other forms of attention may be activethe result that may have been predicted given the understanding of attention as a heterogeneous phenomenon that potentially includes many different neural mechanisms and processes. In particular, the argument that gist can be consciously perceived outside the narrow focus of attention was refuted by evidence that diffuse attention could still be acting outside a narrow spotlight when the central task was not sufficiently demanding.…”