The relationship between belief and credence

Jackson, Elizabeth

doi:10.1111/phc3.12668

Cited by 29 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 144 publications

(252 reference statements)

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“…We will use the term 'confidence' to refer to the degree to which one believes in a causal relation irrespective of whether the content of that belief invokes a graded or non-graded concept of causation. While the question of whether belief is graded is a question for epistemology (Jackson, 2020), there is some evidence that people report varying levels of belief in causal relations. Though only a handful of studies on general causal judgments-judgments of whether a type of event generally causes a type of outcome-have investigated confidence in causal judgments, these studies have shown that people report being more confident in their causal judgments when they have more relevant data (Collins & Shanks, 2006;Liljeholm & Cheng, 2009;Perales & Shanks, 2003;Schlottmann & Anderson, 1993;Shanks, 1987;Shou & Smithson, 2015).…”

Section: Confidencementioning

confidence: 99%

Confidence and gradation in causal judgment

et al. 2022

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When comparing the roles of the lightning strike and the dry climate in causing the forest fire, one might think that the lightning strike is more of a cause than the dry climate, or one might think that the lightning strike completely caused the fire while the dry conditions did not cause it at all. Psychologists and philosophers have long debated whether such causal judgments are graded; that is, whether people treat some causes as stronger than others. To address this debate, we first reanalyzed data from four recent studies. We found that causal judgments were actually multimodal: although most causal judgments made on a continuous scale were categorical, there was also some gradation. We then tested two competing explanations for this gradation: the confidence explanation, which states that people make graded causal judgments because they have varying degrees of belief in causal relations, and the strength explanation, which states that people make graded causal judgments because they believe that causation itself is graded. Experiment 1 tested the confidence explanation and showed that gradation in causal judgments was indeed moderated by confidence: people tended to make graded causal judgments when they were unconfident, but they tended to make more categorical causal judgments when they were confident. Experiment 2 tested the causal strength explanation and showed that although confidence still explained variation in causal judgments, it did not explain away the effects of normality, causal structure, or the number of candidate causes. Overall, we found that causal judgments were multimodal and that people make graded judgments both when they think a cause is weak and when they are uncertain about its causal role.

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Section: Confidencementioning

confidence: 99%

Confidence and gradation in causal judgment

et al. 2022

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“…31 An influential version of this view establishes that rational belief is credence above a contextually determined threshold (Fantl and McGrath 2010). For further references, see Jackson (2020).…”

Section: Supporters Of Doxasticismmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Limits of Partial Doxasticism

Alonso

2021

The Philosophical Quarterly

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Doxasticism is the thesis that intention is or involves belief in the forthcoming action (Velleman, Harman). Supporters claim that it is only by accepting that thesis that we can explain a wide array of important phenomena, including the special knowledge we have of intentional action, the roles intention plays in facilitating coordination, and the norms of rationality for intention. Others argue that the thesis is subject to counterexample (Davidson, Bratman). Yet some others contend that the thesis can be reformulated in a way that avoids such counterexamples and preserves its explanatory significance (Pears, Setiya). Their suggestion is that we view intention as involving partial—rather than full—belief. I argue that while the move from full to partial doxasticism helps to accommodate such counterexamples, it does so in a way that undermines the ability of the resulting view to explain the coordinating roles of and rationality norms for intention.

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“…For a defence of such views, see for example,Buchak (2014);Friedman (2013b);Staffel (2016) andJackson (2019).7 Lockean views of belief are defended by, for example,Goldman (1979);Foley (1992); Swinburne (2001);Sturgeon (2008) andMarvin (2019). For an overview of this debate seeJackson (2020).…”

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confidence: 99%

Inquiry and confirmation

Falbo

2021

Analysis

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A puzzle arises when combining two individually plausible, yet jointly incompatible, norms of inquiry. On the one hand, it seems that one should not inquire into a question while believing an answer to that question. But, on the other hand, it seems rational to inquire into a question while believing its answer, if one is seeking confirmation. Millson (2021), who has recently identified this puzzle, suggests a possible solution, though he notes that it comes with significant costs. I offer an alternative solution, which does not involve these costs. The best way to resolve the puzzle is to reject the prohibition on inquiring into a question while believing an answer to it. Resolving the puzzle in this way makes salient two fruitful areas in the epistemology of inquiry that merit further investigation. The first concerns the nature of the inquiring attitudes and the second concerns the aim(s) of inquiry. Keywords: inquiry, confirmation, norms of inquiry, inquiring attitudes, aims

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The relationship between belief and credence

Cited by 29 publications

References 144 publications

Confidence and gradation in causal judgment

Confidence and gradation in causal judgment

The Limits of Partial Doxasticism

Inquiry and confirmation

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