The present study was designed to explore the personal and situational determinants of the accuracy in discrimination between memories for perceived and imagined events. Three groups were administered the Creative Imagination Scale (CIS) [1]. In the first group (N = 25) and in the second group (N = 22), the image of three people meeting on a beach was additionally suggested. The third group (N = 2l) served as controls. One week later all subjects were presented a film depicting events that were similar to the previously suggested beach scene. Finally, the subjects' memories of the film were tested with recall and recognition methods. There were more imagery intrusions in the first experimental group than in the control group, i.e., subjects more often described the elements of the suggested scene as coming from the film. Before the memory test the second experimental group was warned not to confuse imagination with perception. They were as accurate in recall and recognition as controls. The number of imagery intrusions correlated significantly with the self-rated vividness of the imagined scene (0.37) but not with the CIS. The implications for practice are discussed.Various kinds of memory distortion have been recently interpreted as inability to distinguish among different sources of information [2][3][4][5][6][7]. In the source monitoring framework, Johnson and her colleagues assume that memory for source is an attribution that is the product of a judgment process [4]. From this view, information about the source of memory is not directly encoded as an abstract tag or label. It is assumed that memory representations contain certain characteristics that reflect the conditions under which they were acquired and that judgments 21 Ó 2000, Baywood Publishing Co., Inc.