We motivate, describe, and discuss a funding strategy that commits outcome-based payments to the scaleup of a poverty alleviation program in the face of doubts about the external validity of available evidence.Keywords: results-based financing, outcome funding, external validity, aid effectiveness Author Affiliation: ⸸ Blavatnik School of Government and St Antony's College, University of Oxford. richard.sedlmayr@sant.ox.ac.uk.Transparency Statement: Supplementary materials, data, and code are accessible on the Open Science Framework (osf.io/mp5ns).
Disclosures: My involvement in project design and donor advisory could have affected the neutrality of my assessments.Acknowledgments: This work was prepared in the context of an ongoing project involving multiple parties. It could not have emerged without the thought partnership of Avnish Gungadurdoss, Douglas Emeott, and Juan Camilo Villalobos of Instiglio, a nonprofit organization that promotes results-based financing in development and has the overall responsibility for the management of the project. I thank Dianne Calvi, Celeste Brubaker, and Caroline Bernadi at Village Enterprise; Jessica Cartwright and Radana Crhova at the UK Department for International Development; Duc Tran and Joaquin Carbonell at the US Agency for International Development; and Wesley Panek and Alice Gugelev at Global Development Incubator. I also benefitted from relevant interactions with Stefan Dercon, Mushfiq Mobarak, Jan Witt, Bill Savedoff, Owen Barder, James Snowden, Celeste Brubaker, Stefan Dercon, Mara Arioldi, and Julien Labonne. Any errors are mine.
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INTRODUCTIONPayment-by-Results (PbR) involves pledges by funders to pay implementers of social and development programs as a function of yet-unachieved outcomes. Skeptics warn that this is not an evidence-based approach because it appears to defy empirical insights on the effects of extrinsic performance incentives on intrinsic motivation (Frey, 2017). But the objective of linking payments to evidence of impact must not be limited to the creation of performance incentives. It could be to give demonstrably impactful approaches the upper hand in the struggle for resources and thereby alter the constituency of the social and development sector in favor of cost-effective ones. Viewed through this lens, PbR is the very definition of evidencebased policy. This does not negate that PbR -like other grantmaking approaches -can have diverse pitfalls.We explore an application that involves the expansion of so-called ultra-poor graduation programs. These have been studied extensively and a substantial body of evidence exists. However, their cost-effectiveness relative to other poverty alleviation approaches is not easily established because few other approaches have been evaluated with equal rigor. Further, because of their complexity and associated uncertainty about their critical success factors, it remains difficult to make confident projections of impact at large scale: in other words, the external validity of available evidence is in doubt....