2018
DOI: 10.1016/j.jclepro.2018.04.223
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The revenue and cost sharing contract of pricing and servicing policies in a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain

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Cited by 132 publications
(76 citation statements)
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“…Research on mixed recycling modes: Jena and Sarmah [22] studied the competition and cooperation modes of different recyclers, established corresponding mathematical models for different remanufacturing configurations, and reached equilibrium decisions under each configuration. Under the dual-channel CLSC [23], revenue sharing, the cost sharing mechanism can increase retailers' efforts in repair and recycling. Abbey et al [24] studied the complex situation of manufacturers recycling and remanufacturing to the mixed recycling of manufacturers and third parties and analyzed the optimal pricing under different conditions.…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Research on mixed recycling modes: Jena and Sarmah [22] studied the competition and cooperation modes of different recyclers, established corresponding mathematical models for different remanufacturing configurations, and reached equilibrium decisions under each configuration. Under the dual-channel CLSC [23], revenue sharing, the cost sharing mechanism can increase retailers' efforts in repair and recycling. Abbey et al [24] studied the complex situation of manufacturers recycling and remanufacturing to the mixed recycling of manufacturers and third parties and analyzed the optimal pricing under different conditions.…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…On the premise that there were two sales channels in the CLSC, Zheng et al [36] used two-part pricing contracts to achieve the coordination of the CLSC under different channel power. Xie et al [37] discussed the impact of revenue-sharing and cost-sharing contracts on CLSC recovery and pricing. On the premise that there are both defective product recycling and waste product recycling in a CLSC, Zhang et al [38] used a revenue sharing contract to achieve the coordination of the CLSC.…”
Section: Product Recovery Management Pricing Decision and Coordinatmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In terms of competition between recycling channels and sales channels, some scholars have studied that two retailers compete simultaneously in the process of new product sales and old product recycling. Xie [21] found that the more intense the competition between the two retailers in the process of recycling, the profits of manufacturers and retailers in both positive and reverse channels will be lost. Zhu et al [22] considered the cost and remanufacturing ratio between offline recycling and online recycling channels, a Stackelberg game pricing model between manufacturers, distributors and online recyclers is constructed.…”
Section: Multiple Recycling Channelsmentioning
confidence: 99%