The Revisionist’s Guide to Responsibility

Abstract

Revisionism in the theory of moral responsibility is the idea that some aspect of responsibility practices, attitudes, or concept is in need of revision. While the increased frequency of revisionist language in the literature on free will and moral responsibility is striking, what discussion there has been of revisionism about responsibility and free will tends to be critical. In this paper, I argue that at least one species of revisionism, moderate revisionism, is considerably more sophisticated and defensible than critics have realized. I go on to argue for the advantages of moderate revisionist theories over standard compatibilist and incompatibilist theories. © Springer 2005 Philosophical Studies (2005) 125: 399-429

Free Will and Moral Responsibility: The Trap, the Appreciation of Agency, and the Bubble

“…That question is too large. Yet in some respects, we must confront it in order to understand where to go, and in particular, whether to follow the ''happy hard determinists'' in their quest to abolish the life of moral responsibility, or whether, on the contrary, to do all we can to safeguard it, on 1 There are of course many options open to the compatibilists to revise their position, and I cannot discuss all of them (a good exploration of revisionism is Vargas 2005). Paul Russell's attempt to combine a form of ''fatalism'' with compatibilism (see Russell 2000; Cuypers, forthcoming) is a step in the right direction, but does not, in my opinion, go far enough.…”

Revisionism about free will: a statement & defense

“…One might think responsibility talk is noncognitive even if, for example, it appeals to a (perhaps) truth-functional concept of free will. And, of course, there is the further matter of how we should understand the semantics of free will, something that on my account may yet turn out to be internalist or externalist in its semantics(Vargas 2005a).…”

“…So, if noncognitivism is true and my account were translated into a discourse that makes explicit sense of that architecture of meaning, it would be a bit strange to insist that the result would be a theory committed to problematic realism about moral responsibility. 16 Second, even if we accept the idea that there must be a commitment to something realist here, I have argued that it may make no practical difference if what we refer to is not free will in some strict sense, just so long as it is otherwise a twin of free will with respect to its social, conceptual, and normative roles (Vargas 2004(Vargas , 2005a. Against those species of anti-realist views that I have called property errortheoretic views (e.g., Pereboom's), I have maintained that they face a special explanatory burden.…”

“…This is a matter I do not directly address in Four Views on Free Will, but it is one I have tried to address in other places (Vargas 2004(Vargas , 2005a. Briefly, here is how I take things to stack up.…”

“…So yes, while there is a sense, the conceptionist sense, in which every philosopher is engaged in some form of revision, moderate revisionism of the sort I propose is explicitly conceptual revisionism, a thing less common than the conceptionist revision McKenna rightly suggests is common to philosophical theories. 15 A third point on this matter: we 15 Elsewhere, I have offered a taxonomy of a wide range of possible varieties of revisionism, and distinguished my own brand of moderate revisionism from several alternative varieties, including several possibilities I do not mention here (Vargas 2005a). For usefully related discussions, see also recent work by Nichols (2007). should not run together at least three varieties of revisionism that might plausibly thought to arise in the case of conceptual revision: weak, moderate, and strong.…”