The “revival of communism” or the effect of institutions?: The 1993 Polish parliamentary elections

Kamiński, Marek M.; Lissowski, Grzegorz; Świstak, Piotr

doi:10.1007/978-1-4757-5127-7_9

Cited by 8 publications

(20 citation statements)

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“…The voting on the new law took place in a fervent 3 The new law introduced country-level thresholds of 5% to 8%, required using the d'Hondt-Jefferson divisor method, which is more friendly towards larger parties, instead of the largest remainder HareHamilton method with Dro op quo ta and sub stituted 37 districts w ith 52 smaller d istricts. The average district magnitude decreased from 10.6 to 7.3 (Kaminski, Lissowski, and Swistak 1998). In an electoral system with relatively small districts, the choice of a particular proportional representation (PR) method may strongly influence the distribution of seats among parties (for detailed discussion of various PR method s, see Balinski an d You ng (1982 ) and Taage pera and S hugart (198 9)).…”

Section: The 1993 Dilemma Of Electoral Consolidationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The remainder of this section is based on Kaminski (1998Kaminski ( , 2001) and tells the story of what happened on the Right between 1993 and 1997. A complex model of coalition-formation that uses partition-function form games is developed in Kaminski (2001).…”

Section: The 1993-1997 Consolidation Dilemma Backgroundmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…(See Figure 1.) Political analysts concluded that a large part of the electorate was lost due to coalescing (CBOS 1993). Polls clearly halted further negotiations (Kaminski, Lissowski and Swistak 1998).…”

Section: Payoff Estimationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…These numbers are small and rather unlikely to represent the properties of our actual function f. For instance, to generate the ratio of 1/3, the total seat share of the rightist parties would have to jump from the actual 3.5% for six parties to 10.5% for only five parties. The simulations from Kaminski, Lissowski and Swistak (1998) show a possible jump from f(6) = 3.5% to f(1) = 26.2%. This means that if we define the geometric average ratio as…”

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confidence: 95%

“…parties could win about 35% of seats, enough to form a cabinet with other non-communist parties (Kaminski, Lissowski, and Swistak 1998). In fact, in the next elections in1997, the postsolidarity rightist parties coalesced and jointly with one more anti-communist pre-solidarity party, won 39.4% of votes and 45% of seats.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Collective Action Problems of Political Consolidation: Evidence from Poland

Kamiński¹

2003

Collective Choice

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Section: The 1993 Dilemma Of Electoral Consolidationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The 1993-1997 Consolidation Dilemma Backgroundmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Payoff Estimationmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 95%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Collective Action Problems of Political Consolidation: Evidence from Poland

Kamiński¹

2003

Collective Choice

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Spoiler effects in proportional representation systems: evidence from eight Polish parliamentary elections, 1991–2015

Kamiński

2018

Public Choice

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I consider a model of multiple winner elections with several types of spoilers. In single-office elections, a "classic" spoiler turns a winner into a nonwinner and a non-winner into a winner. Such spoilers rarely appear in multi-office elections. In such elections, spoilers include a "Kingmaker", who turns a non-winner into a winner; a "Kingslayer", who turns a winner into a non-winner; a "Valuegobbler", who subtracts from some competitor more seats than it receives; and "Selfspoilers", who may be hurt by competing separately rather than creating an electoral coalition. Various strategic spoilers, such as fake parties, are possible as well. I look for spoilers in eight Polish parliamentary elections that have taken place since the fall of communism in 1989. In two elections, the consequences of spoilers were massive. In 1993, multiple spoilers on the right helped the two postcommunist parties return to power, slow down decommunization and create strong institutional obstacles to further democratization. In 2015, a spoiler manufactured a majority for the largest party (PiS) and, as a consequence, enabled PiS quickly to implement radical reforms. In other elections, spoilers had smaller, but noticeable consequences. The results suggest that parliamentary elections using PR party-list systems are vulnerable to spoiler problems that may cause significant political effects.

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Political Learning in Post-Communist Elections

Dawisha¹,

Deets²

2006

East European Politics and Societies: and Cultures

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This article draws several conclusions. First, that elections provide critical information for shaping behavior, since in the second and third rounds, party elites and voters behaved in ways that were rational considering the outcome of the previous election. Second, on the whole, states have adopted a variety of systems and rarely changed them in major ways after the second round of elections, indicating that electoral systems quickly become constraining institutions. Where they have been changed, movement has been away from the extremes of either high disproportionality or proportionality. Third, results from the first three rounds of elections indicate declines in party system fragmentation, disproportionality, volatility, and wasted votes, indicating a growth in strategic voting. Finally, except in the very important case of party volatility, and Russia, the view that there is a generalized gap between the post-Soviet cases and the East European cases is not supported by the evidence.While the collapse of communism was heralded as a triumph for liberal democracy, there has been considerably less optimism about the actual process for translating popular will into coherent governance. Throughout the 1990s, there was fear that the presumed disappearance of the communist parties would be replaced by inchoate party systems filled with ephemeral movements reflecting unclear interests and reemerging ethnic identities (Bunce and

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The “revival of communism” or the effect of institutions?: The 1993 Polish parliamentary elections

Cited by 8 publications

References 6 publications

The Collective Action Problems of Political Consolidation: Evidence from Poland

The Collective Action Problems of Political Consolidation: Evidence from Poland

Spoiler effects in proportional representation systems: evidence from eight Polish parliamentary elections, 1991–2015

Political Learning in Post-Communist Elections

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