The rhetoric and practice of the ‘ownership’ of security sector reform processes in fragile countries: the case of Kosovo

Abstract

Successful outcomes in security sector reform (SSR) implementation are often conditioned on two key inter-related operational principles: international agencies' understanding of the 'local context' where they intervene and their encouragement of the country 'ownership' of the institutional reforms they advocate. Outcomes, however, are determined by power, and different patterns of outcomes are likely to emerge from different types and degrees of power exercised by a multiplicity of actors operating in a dynamic political and social context. Drawing upon these inter-connections between outcomes and power, this article examines Kosovo's security sector development experience since 1999. It argues that depending on types of, and changes in, power-based interplays between international and domestic forces, different patterns of 'ownership' have emerged in the context of SSR implementation in Kosovo.Responding to domestic governance deficits in the developing world has been at the centre of the international peacebuilding agenda since it was first formulated in the Secretary-General's 'Agenda for Peace'. 1 In this landmark UN document released in 1992 and many other related international policy reports produced since then, 2 peace is conceptualized by reference to conflict and insecurity that are associated with the inability of the state to enforce law and order over its territory and meet the basic security needs of its citizens in an effective and democratic way. Poor or bad governance, from this perspective, causes violent conflict, and the UN and other international agencies should provide 'support for the transformation of deficient national structures and capabilities, and for the strengthening of new democratic institutions' in order to 'solidify' peace. 3 Security sector reform (SSR) represents this institutions-focused approach to peacebuilding: that is, enabling conditions of durable peace requires the creation of effective state security institutions

Differences in the local perception of EULEX and KFOR in their security-related tasks

“…Importantly for EULEX's later deployment, in 1999 UNMIK created the Kosovo Police Service, in cooperation with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (Dursun-Özkanca 2018). The Service, designed to reach 5000-7000 police officers and controlled by UNMIK, turned out to be one of UNMIK's biggest achievements due to its effectiveness and multi-ethnic character (Sahin 2017).…”

The role of epistemic communities: local think tanks, international practitioners and security sector reform in Kosovo

“…Local knowledge also has a role in the knowledge formation of international SSR (Holohan 2016;Sahin 2017). Sahin (2017) demonstrates how different outcomes of SSR 'ownership' in Kosovo have resulted from the different patterns of power relationship and interactions between local and international actors.…”

“…Local knowledge also has a role in the knowledge formation of international SSR (Holohan 2016;Sahin 2017). Sahin (2017) demonstrates how different outcomes of SSR 'ownership' in Kosovo have resulted from the different patterns of power relationship and interactions between local and international actors. For example, during the 'internationally supervised' SSR of the post-independence period and the development of the National Security Strategy (NSS), the Kosovo government was seemingly pressured to approve the international document, only to later resist its implementation and initiate a new internal review process (Sahin 2017, 23-24).…”

Local ownership as international governmentality: Evidence from the EU mission in the Horn of Africa

“…General African response to a delegation coming by with an offer of a mission would be "yes please come and we have a lots and lots things to do" and basically say yes to anything that is suggested in hope that whatever comes out will be us useful one way or another. (Interview 25) Once the mission is launched, however, the same authorities that had previously issued the invitation often do not pull their weight in the implementation of objectives which were not of their own making (Kappler & Richmond, 2011;Rayroux & Wilén, 2014;Sahin, 2017;Vandemoortele, 2012).…”