The right and the wrong kind of reasons

Abstract

In a number of recent philosophical debates, it has become common to distinguish between two kinds of normative reasons, often called the right kind of reasons (henceforth: RKR) and the wrong kind of reasons (henceforth: WKR). The distinction was first introduced in discussions of the so-called buck-passing account of value, which aims to analyze value properties in terms of reasons for pro-attitudes and has been argued to face the wrong kind of reasons problem. But nowadays it also gets applied in other philosophical contexts and to reasons for other responses than pro-attitudes, for example in recent debates about evidentialism and pragmatism about reasons for belief. While there seems to be wide agreement that there is a general and uniform distinction that applies to reasons for different responses, there is little agreement about the scope, relevance and nature of this distinction.Our aim in this article is to shed some light on this issue by surveying the RKR/WKR distinction as it has been drawn with respect to different responses, and by examining how it can be understood as a uniform distinction across different contexts. We start by considering reasons for pro-attitudes and emotions in the context of the buck-passing account of value ( §1). Subsequently we address the distinction that philosophers have drawn with respect to reasons for other attitudes, such as beliefs and intentions ( §2), as well as with respect to reasons for action ( §3). We discuss the similarities and differences between the ways in which philosophers have drawn the RKR/WKR distinction in these areas and offer different interpretations of the idea of a general, uniform distinction. The major upshot is that there is at least one interesting way of substantiating a general RKR/WKR distinction with respect to a broad range of attitudes as well as actions. We argue that this has important implications for the proper scope of buck-passing accounts and the status of the wrong kind of reasons problem ( §4). §1 Reasons for pro-attitudes and emotions According to an influential view that can be traced back at least to Brentano, what it is for some X to be good or valuable can be analyzed in terms of a normative relation that holds between X and certain positive or negative attitudes or emotions towards X, such as e.g.

Minimal disturbance: in defence of pragmatic reasons of the right kind

“…This 'wrong for what? '-line of thought is compatible with the methodological shortcoming in the debate that this paper draws attention to.4 For overviews, seeGertken and Kiesewetter (2017) andSylvan (2016).5 Schroeder proposes a fourth earmark: 'pragmatic reasons for belief have a recognizable 'flavor' that makes them feel intuitively like reasons for other attitudes […]'. He himself thinks that this is 'arguably not a proper earmark in its own right' and does not spell it out further(Schroeder 2012: 460).6 This is connected to the debate about doxastic voluntarism, which I bracket.…”

Permissible Promise-Making Under Uncertainty

“…In such cases, the moral reasons to make the promise have to do with avoiding serious harm to another and have nothing to do with the promise itself or the conventions governing permissible promise-making. This distinction is analogous to the distinction between the ‘right kind’ vs. ‘wrong kind’ of normative reasons—e.g., admiring Anne because she is admirable vs. admiring Diego because an evil demon threatened to destroy you if you did not do so (see Gertken and Kiesewetter [2017] for an overview of this literature).…”

Fittingness

“…I won't rehearse the back‐and‐forth here. However, as a recent discussion in this journal of the relevant literature reveals (Gertken & Kiesewetter, ), it's clear that, at least so far, no proposed solution to the WKR problem has gained wide acceptance . And I should highlight that, if it turns out there is no adequate solution to this problem to be had, then this would undermine not just a reasons‐based analysis of fittingness (and value), but also the currently fashionable approach to normativity in which this analysis figures, viz., the reasons‐first approach…”