The right of withdrawal in the treaty of Lisbon: a game theoretic reflection on different decision processes in the EU

Lechner, Susanne; Ohr, Renate

doi:10.1007/s10657-009-9139-1

Cited by 25 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…Hirschman regarded the state, alongside the family and the church, among those organizations where ‘the virtual unavailability of the threat of exit’ will incentivize voice (Hirschman, 1970: 97–98). Certainly, exit options are hardly readily available; few states make provision for secession in their constitutions and, even where they do, the risks associated with exit are likely to be very high (Lachapelle and Qvortrup, 2020; Lechner and Ohr, 2011). Nevertheless, in plurinational states, which house multiple nations, often with overlapping boundaries, the territorial integrity of the political community is more likely to be challenged.…”

Section: Territorial Dissatisfaction After Brexit: Voice Exit and Re-...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Brexit and the union: Territorial voice, exit and re-entry strategies in Scotland and Northern Ireland after EU exit

McEwen

Murphy

2021

International Political Science Review

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This article examines the effects of Brexit on the internal boundaries and territorial future of the United Kingdom (UK). Divergent Brexit preferences, coupled with the process of negotiating and preparing for Brexit, have raised new questions about the ability of the UK to remain united. Focusing upon Scotland and Northern Ireland, where territorial challenges are most acute, the article draws upon and adapts Hirschman’s voice, exit and loyalty framework to examine the strategic choices and options faced by institutional actors in each case when determining constitutional and political options in response to Brexit. The article contends that, while credible exit threats were used to bolster voice in the Brexit negotiations, the Brexit vote and subsequent process have exposed the limitations of territorial voice, and unleashed new exit dynamics. We enhance the framework by exploring the concept of re-entry, exploring the contrasting paths these territories would face to re-enter the European Union (EU).

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Section: Territorial Dissatisfaction After Brexit: Voice Exit and Re-...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Brexit and the union: Territorial voice, exit and re-entry strategies in Scotland and Northern Ireland after EU exit

McEwen

Murphy

2021

International Political Science Review

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“…1 This important development is beginning to attract scholarly attention, particularly from economists (e.g. Eerola et al , 2004; Gradstein, 2004; Lechner and Ohr, 2011).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Constitutional Secession Rights, Exit Threats and Multinational Democracy

Shorten

2013

Political Studies

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Are constitutional secession rights compatible with democracy in a multinational political association? Multinational political associations are political formations that allow for multiple and parallel projects of national identity promotion, and are more likely than other political formations to experience secessionist pressure. One argument against incorporating secession rights in a constitution is that rights-holders might deploy exit threats in order to strengthen their bargaining position.This article argues that opponents of secession rights have inflated the case against them. Two potentially objectionable forms of exit threat are identified -cynical exit threats and exploitative exit threats. Cynical exit threats are (nearly) impossible to execute, and the most seriously exploitative exit threats can be prevented by a sensitively designed secession clause. However, secession rights do facilitate exit threats, and in doing so may generate unfair power asymmetries and threaten political stability. Since none of the objections to secession rights are decisive, decisions about whether to include them in a constitution should be made on the basis of their likely effects on democratic solidarity.

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“…Susanne Lechner und Renate Ohr29 Vgl.Berthold / Neumann (2003) undBolton / Roland / Spolaore (1996).30 Vgl. im FolgendenLechner / Ohr (2008).31 Dies ist natürlich eine für die Übertragung auf die EU etwas einschränkende Annahme, da hier ja -zumeist sogar recht lange -Verhandlungen stattfinden. Zur Verdeutlichung der Grundaussage ist die Annahme jedoch zunächst akzeptabel.32 Auch diese Annahme ist für die Übertragung auf die EU nicht ganz realistisch, da ja immer wieder neue Entscheidungen anstehen, die zwischen den Mitgliedern verhandelt werden müssen, allerdings zumeist mit wechselnder Besetzung der "M1"-Position.OPEN ACCESS | Licensed under CC BY 4.0 | https://creativecommons.org/about/cclicenses/ DOI https://doi.org/10.3790/978-3-428-53256-8 | Generated on 2023-01-16 12:26:06…”

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Governance in der Wirtschaftspolitik.

Ahrens¹,

Ohr²

2010

Schriften Des Vereins Für Socialpolitik

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Governance has become a frequently used and multi-faceted concept. Many questions in economics and politics that are discussed as governance problems today were assessed as questions of the economic order in the past and later on have been analyzed with the instruments of institutional economics. Research on governance is not confined to economics; rather it is carried out in other social sciences, too. This paper identifies and analyzes seven concepts of governance. They are attributed to a hierarchy of governance that ranges from a micro to a macro level. The Governance of Transactions, Corporate Governance or Co-operative Governance are assigned to the micro level, while Good Governance, New Governance and Global Governance belong to the macro level. Economic Governance acts on both levels. All these concepts of governance bear economic policy implications. Basically, governance can be identified as an order consisting of institutions in the sense of institutional economics, but increasingly hybrid elements are added to this view on governance. Therefore, a new research program has to be set up focussing on the empirics of these hybrids.

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The right of withdrawal in the treaty of Lisbon: a game theoretic reflection on different decision processes in the EU

Cited by 25 publications

References 34 publications

Brexit and the union: Territorial voice, exit and re-entry strategies in Scotland and Northern Ireland after EU exit

Brexit and the union: Territorial voice, exit and re-entry strategies in Scotland and Northern Ireland after EU exit

Constitutional Secession Rights, Exit Threats and Multinational Democracy

Governance in der Wirtschaftspolitik.

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