2002
DOI: 10.1007/978-0-312-29910-1
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The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan

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Cited by 64 publications
(10 citation statements)
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“…Around the province of Herat alone this new policy helped raise the support of some 20,000 pro-government local militias in 1987-88. 18 Contrary to some Western observers' views at the time however, the main initial impetus behind this policy shift in Afghanistan came primarily not from Moscow, but from the members of the Operational Group (OG) of the Soviet Defence Ministry working in Afghanistan.…”
Section: Local Dynamics: the Failure To Coordinate Military And Politmentioning
confidence: 92%
“…Around the province of Herat alone this new policy helped raise the support of some 20,000 pro-government local militias in 1987-88. 18 Contrary to some Western observers' views at the time however, the main initial impetus behind this policy shift in Afghanistan came primarily not from Moscow, but from the members of the Operational Group (OG) of the Soviet Defence Ministry working in Afghanistan.…”
Section: Local Dynamics: the Failure To Coordinate Military And Politmentioning
confidence: 92%
“…Th is was the case, for example, of General Zia al-Haq of Pakistan whose actions led to the rise of the Taliban. 3 It was also the case of both Czar Nicholas I of Russia and Emperor Napoleon III of France whose confrontation over the Church of the Holy Sepulcher in Jerusalem was one of the causes of the Crimean War. 4 In 1853, both Nicholas I and Napoleon III were having serious legitimacy problems.…”
Section: Religion and Political Legitimacymentioning
confidence: 96%
“…During the military campaign in eastern Afghanistan in 1996, the Taliban seized large amounts of military equipment. Troops, in one operation in Jalalabad, reportedly captured 250 Russian tanks (Nojumi 2002:150). Similarly, though they began the 1990–1996 rebellion armed mainly with knives (possibly with one Kalashnikov), the Malian Mouvement Populaire de Liberation de l’Azawad captured increasingly large numbers of weapons from government arsenals, allowing them to reach a stage where they could challenge government forces (Bevan 2005:186).…”
Section: Arms Acquisition Preferencesmentioning
confidence: 99%