The role of a “common is moral” heuristic in the stability and change of moral norms.

Abstract

Moral norms are fundamental for virtually all social interactions, including cooperation. Moral norms develop and change, but the mechanisms underlying when, and how, such changes occur are not well-described by theories of moral psychology. We tested, and confirmed, the hypothesis that the commonness of an observed behavior consistently influences its moral status, which we refer to as the common is moral (CIM) heuristic. In 9 experiments, we used an experimental model of dynamic social interaction that manipulated the commonness of altruistic and selfish behaviors to examine the change of peoples' moral judgments. We found that both altruistic and selfish behaviors were judged as more moral, and less deserving of punishment, when common than when rare, which could be explained by a classical formal model (social impact theory) of behavioral conformity. Furthermore, judgments of common versus rare behaviors were faster, indicating that they were computationally more efficient. Finally, we used agent-based computer simulations to investigate the endogenous population dynamics predicted to emerge if individuals use the CIM heuristic, and found that the CIM heuristic is sufficient for producing 2 hallmarks of real moral norms; stability and sudden changes. Our results demonstrate that commonness shapes our moral psychology through mechanisms similar to behavioral conformity with wide implications for understanding the stability and change of moral norms. (PsycINFO Database Record

Nudging with Care: The Risks and Benefits of Social Information

“…Providing empirical information will often make people conclude that common, widespread behavior (good or bad) is acceptable, at a minimum, and often even approved of. Our result is in line with recent work showing that commonness of observed behavior influences its moral status (Lindström et al, 2018). For example, it has been shown that when tax evasion is perceived as more common, it will also be seen as more acceptable, which in turn influences its prevalence (Eriksson et al, 2015).…”

“…Publicizing any behavior, whether good or bad, may lead the receiver to conclude that the behavior is also approved of. In this case empirical information leads to parallel normative conclusions (Eriksson et al, 2015;Lindström et al, 2018;Bicchieri et al, 2019b). Conversely, when getting normative information about common approval of good behavior, one may not infer that most people behave in the appropriate way.…”

How social relationships shape moral wrongness judgments

“…, indicating that the more "on-target" the effect of an action in violating a given function, the more harshly that action was judged. Action likelihood was also negatively correlated with moral wrongness judgments (p < .001, 95% CI [-.21, -.18]), indicating that rarer actions were judged more harshly, consistent with past research (47). These results are robust when controlling for demographic factors.…”

Sensitivity to ingroup and outgroup norms in the association between commonality and morality

“…Nearly 300 years later, a rich body of empirical evidence substantiates Hume's observation. When told that a behavior is common, people infer that it is moral (Lindström, Jangard, Selbing, & Olsson, 2018), and when told that a behavior is moral, people infer that it is common (Eriksson, Strimling, & Coultas, 2015). Perceptions of commonality and morality are inextricably linked (Bear & Knobe, 2017).…”