“…A number of significant critiques of the centrality approach to moral identity [e.g., Nucci, 2004;Pasupathi & Wainryb, 2010a;Proulx & Chandler, 2009;Turiel & Smetana, 1984] have been proposed, on various grounds. Furthermore, the field of identity research [e.g., Erikson, 1968;Marcia, Waterman, Matteson, Archer, & Orlofsky, 1993;McLean, Syed, Yoder, & Greenhoot, 2014] suggests important considerations in studying identity of any kind -considerations that are overlooked in the centrality approach. In the remainder of our commentary, we consider how one might build from some of the existing critiques and findings an alternative way of thinking about moral identity -one that allows for examining normative developmental changes as well as a broader range of individual differences and, ultimately, also the development of individual differences and specific forms of moral identity.…”