The Role of "Enemy Images" and Ideology of Elite Belief Systems

Abstract

We use data from the Leadership Opinion Project (LOP), a panel survey of American opinion leaders which brackets the end of the Cold War, to investigate two interrelated questions about the structure of elites' foreign policy beliefs. We assess, first, whether the militant internationalism/cooperative internationalism scheme, developed primarily by Wittkopf (1981, 1990) and Holsti and Rosenau (1990), has continued relevance now that the USSR has collapsed; and second, whether Hurwitz and Peffley's (1987, 1990; see also Peffley and Hurwitz, 1992; Hurwitz, Peffley, and Seligson, 1993) domain‐specific, hierarchical model of mass belief structure can be applied to elitebelief systems. The evidence indicates that respondents' past stances toward military and cooperative ventures are highly predictive of their views once the Cold War ends. This continuity in leaders' postures toward international affairs, in itself, suggests that “enemy images” of the Soviet Union were less important within elite belief systems than Hurwitz and Peffley (1990; see also Peffley and Hurwitz, 1992) posited for the mass public. The starkest difference, however, between their findings for mass samples and our findings for a leadership sample centers on the importance of ideology in constraining foreign policy beliefs, and the close interconnection with domestic beliefs. Consequently, as we illustrate, predictable ideological divisions among opinion leaders persist in the post–Cold War era. In sum, our evidence demonstrates considerable continuity in elites' beliefs despite profound changes in the global system, and reaffirms the importance that ideology plays in structuring attitudes within elite belief systems.

Violence in Ideological and Non‐Ideological Groups: A Quantitative Analysis of Qualitative Data1

“…Ideology, however, represents something more than a set of beliefs about what is right. Rather, ideology entails an integrated set of values and goals that assume unique status in which attainment of salient goals, or failure to attain these goals, is held to be determined by a fixed, relatively rigid, set of beliefs about the causes influencing goal attainment and failures in goal attainment (Murray & Cowden, 1999). In other words, ideology involves a mental model specifying desirable goals and the causes shaping goal attainment (Strange & Mumford, 2005).…”

Steeped in International Affairs?: The Foreign Policy Views of the Tea Party

“…Ole Holsti () offers a clue. Research on the structure of American foreign policy opinion has found that two major dimensions structure most of mass and elite attitudes on international affairs in the United States (Holsti and Rosenau , ; Wittkopf ; Murray ; Murray and Cowden ; Rathbun ). Holsti, along with his coauthor Jim Rosenau, argues that particular combinations of these two attitude clusters, militant internationalism (MI) and cooperative internationalism (CI), allow for the construction of a fourfold typology (1988).…”

“…In other articles (Rathbun ), I call this “hierarchy,” Chittick, Billingsley and Travis () “militarism” and Nincic and Ramos () a “negative incentives‐based means of policy.” Questions typically used to capture this latent variable evoke the discussion above. Militant internationalists believe that “rather than simply countering our opponent's thrusts, it is necessary to strike at the heart of an opponent's power.” An embrace of the importance of a strong reputation is evident in a belief that “there is considerable validity in the ‘domino theory’ that when one nation falls to aggressor nations, others nearby will soon follow a similar path” (Holsti and Rosenau , ; Wittkopf ; Murray ; Murray and Cowden ; Rathbun ).…”

“…() “multilateralism,” and Nincic and Ramos an “other‐regarding” foreign policy. Those with high scores on cooperative internationalism believe in promoting human rights, strengthening international institutions, giving international aid, and protecting the global environment (Holsti and Rosenau , ; Wittkopf ; Murray ; Murray and Cowden ; Rathbun ). CI marks a sense of global identity and solidarity.…”

The Shape of Elite Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy, 1992 to 2004

“…Sobel (2001) explains these categories in the following light: internationalists favor both conciliatory and conflict strategies, accommodationists embrace cooperative internationalism, hardliners take a militant internationalist approach, and isolationists reject internationalism and most U.S. activity not directly relevant to the country's survival. Murray and Cowden (1999) adjusted the observed variables used by Holsti and Rosenau's approach in removing most of the USSR‐related variables and substituting more general militarism and oppressor questions. Holsti (1996) suggests that liberals tend to be accommodationists and are unsupportive of militant internationalism, while conservatives are internationalists or hardliners who perceive the world as conflictual and will respond with military force when necessary.…”