2012
DOI: 10.1007/s10683-012-9328-6
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The role of information in different bargaining protocols

Abstract: We analyze a bargaining protocol recently proposed in the literature vis-à-vis unconstrained negotiation. This new mechanism extracts "gains from trade" inherent in the differing valuation of two parties towards various issues where conflict exists. We assess the role of incomplete vs. complete information in the efficiency achieved by this new mechanism and by unconstrained negotiation. We find that unconstrained negotiation does best under a situation of complete information where the valuations of both barg… Show more

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Cited by 6 publications
(3 citation statements)
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References 33 publications
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“…( 2013 ) en Social preferences /heuristics RT is increasing in the number of social properties of the allocations that heterogeneous subjects attended to, e.g., kindness, fairness Mini-ultimatum games Hortala-Vallve et al. ( 2013 ) tp Cognitive effort Better plans of action were pursued the longer RT was, the relationship between RT and the (in)completeness of information depends on the bargaining procedure Bargaining Jiang ( 2013 ) en Cognitive effort Honest choices exhibit longer RT Cheating games Lindner and Sutter ( 2013 ) tp Iterated/strategic reasoning, cognitive effort Subjects’ behavior was closer to the equilibrium prediction under time pressure 11–20 Money Request Game Lotito et al. ( 2013 ) en Dual-system RT and own contributions are negatively related, RT and others’ recent contributions (i.e., degree of prior cooperation) are negatively related Public goods game McKinney and Huyck ( 2013 ) en Eureka learning, heuristics 35% of subjects experienced a Eureka moment–i.e., realizing that a heuristic works well–after which RT is consistently less Nim game Neo et al.…”
Section: Appendix 1: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…( 2013 ) en Social preferences /heuristics RT is increasing in the number of social properties of the allocations that heterogeneous subjects attended to, e.g., kindness, fairness Mini-ultimatum games Hortala-Vallve et al. ( 2013 ) tp Cognitive effort Better plans of action were pursued the longer RT was, the relationship between RT and the (in)completeness of information depends on the bargaining procedure Bargaining Jiang ( 2013 ) en Cognitive effort Honest choices exhibit longer RT Cheating games Lindner and Sutter ( 2013 ) tp Iterated/strategic reasoning, cognitive effort Subjects’ behavior was closer to the equilibrium prediction under time pressure 11–20 Money Request Game Lotito et al. ( 2013 ) en Dual-system RT and own contributions are negatively related, RT and others’ recent contributions (i.e., degree of prior cooperation) are negatively related Public goods game McKinney and Huyck ( 2013 ) en Eureka learning, heuristics 35% of subjects experienced a Eureka moment–i.e., realizing that a heuristic works well–after which RT is consistently less Nim game Neo et al.…”
Section: Appendix 1: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Without question, with the increasing adoption of EC in the world and its exceptional potential, it is now clearly evident that countries where ICT are more developed have an advantage. EC is beginning to be considered as a new form of business, with extensive scope to create new strategies and business opportunities, either at the level of organizations (it allows for the reduction of costs and process improvements), or at the level of the communication channel with the customer (it allows new sales channels, new products and services, new forms of relationship and new opportunities in new business projects) [3].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…-Vallve et al, 2013), then it is appropriate to have a fixed group to interact over time. In this case both individual-level clusters and group-level clusters can be inherited by the experimental design.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%