The Role of Magnitude in Kant's Critical Philosophy

Sutherland, Daniel

doi:10.1080/00455091.2004.10716573

Cited by 17 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…16. See, in particular, Sutherland (2004aSutherland ( , 2004b, to which the discussion that follows is indebted. 17.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Spatial representation, magnitude and the two stems of cognition

Land¹

2014

Can. J. of Philosophy

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The aim of this paper is to show that attention to Kant’s philosophy of mathematics sheds light on the doctrine that there are two stems of the cognitive capacity, which are distinct, but equally necessary for cognition. Specifically, I argue for the following four claims: (i) The distinctive structure of outer sensible intuitions must be understood in terms of the concept of magnitude. (ii) The act of sensibly representing a magnitude involves a special act of spontaneity Kant ascribes to a capacity he calls the productive imagination. (iii) Contrary to what is assumed by many commentators, it is not the case that the Two Stems Doctrine implies that a representation is either sensible or spontaneity-dependent, but not both. (iv) Outer sensible intuitions are both sensible and spontaneity-dependent – they are sensible because they exhibit the kind of structure Kant takes to be distinctive of outer sensible intuitions, and they depend on spontaneity because they are cases of sensibly representing a magnitude.

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“…16. See, in particular, Sutherland (2004aSutherland ( , 2004b, to which the discussion that follows is indebted. 17.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It is a consequence of this definition that mathematics cognizes magnitudes. For discussion see Sutherland (2004b).…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Spatial representation, magnitude and the two stems of cognition

Land¹

2014

Can. J. of Philosophy

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“…8 A complete account of Kant's philosophy of mathematics would require a treatment of his more abstract notions of magnitude, and hence consideration of points brought forward by the authors mentioned in the previous note and by other authors. For more on the distinction between Kant's abstract and concrete notions of magnitude, see my Sutherland 2004. I discuss Kant's views on arithmetic and algebra in more detail in Sutherland, Forthcoming.…”

Section: University Of Illinois At Chicagomentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A more complete account of the role of the categories and schemata in Kant's philosophy of mathematics would require an independent treatment of quantitas. I discuss the distinction between quanta and quantitas in more detail in Sutherland 2004. 26 I follow the editors of Kant's Lectures on Metaphysics in thinking that the term 'latter' had been mistakenly inserted for 'former' either by Kant, by the student taking the notes, or by a transcriber (students very often hired someone to rewrite their notes). See Kant 1997, 460, note b.…”

Section: University Of Illinois At Chicagomentioning

confidence: 99%

Kant's Philosophy of Mathematics and the Greek Mathematical Tradition

Sutherland¹

2004

The Philosophical Review

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“…7 7 For Kant's concept of magnitude in the Axioms of Intuition and its relation to the traditional theory of ratios or proportion see Sutherland 2004 and 2006. …”

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NEWTON AND KANT: QUANTITY OF MATTER IN THE METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF NATURAL SCIENCE

Friedman

2012

The Southern J of Philosophy

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Immanuel Kant's Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (1786) provides metaphysical foundations for the application of mathematics to empirically given nature. The application that Kant primarily has in mind is that achieved in Isaac Newton's Principia (1687). Thus, Kant's first chapter, the Phoronomy, concerns the mathematization of speed or velocity, and his fourth chapter, the Phenomenology, concerns the empirical application of the Newtonian notions of true or absolute space, time, and motion. This paper concentrates on Kant's second and third chapters-the Dynamics and the Mechanics, respectively-and argues that they are best read as providing a transcendental explanation of the conditions for the possibility of applying the (mathematical) concept of quantity of matter to experience. Kant again has in mind the empirical measures of this quantity that Newton fashions in the Principia, and he aims to make clear, in particular, how Newton achieves a universal measure for all bodies whatsoever by projecting the static quantity of terrestrial weight into the heavens by means of the theory of universal gravitation. Kant is not attempting to prove a priori what Newton has established empirically but, rather, to clarify the character of Newton's mathematization by building Newton's empirical measures into the very concept of matter that is articulated in the Metaphysical Foundations.

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The Role of Magnitude in Kant's Critical Philosophy

Cited by 17 publications

References 10 publications

Spatial representation, magnitude and the two stems of cognition

Spatial representation, magnitude and the two stems of cognition

Kant's Philosophy of Mathematics and the Greek Mathematical Tradition

NEWTON AND KANT: QUANTITY OF MATTER IN THE METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF NATURAL SCIENCE

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