The role of optimal threats in auction design

Figueroa, Nicolás; Skreta, Vasiliki

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2008.11.006

Cited by 23 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 11 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…for instance by Rubinstein (1982) or Sobel and Takahashi (1983). Auctions have been studied by Vickrey (1961); Klemperer (1999); Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000); Figueroa and Skreta (2009) among others, and used more recently by Montes et al (2018) and by Bounie et al (2018) for the sale of consumer information.…”

Section: Selling Mechanismsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Data Intermediaries and Selling Mechanisms for Customized Consumer Information

2019

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article analyzes how the selling mechanisms used by a data intermediary impact the optimal information structure sold to competing firms. We analyze how take it or leave it offers, sequential bargaining, and auctions, change the bargaining power between the data intermediary and competing firms, impacting the price of information, and the amount of data collected on the market for information. We highlight conflicting interests between data intermediaries, data protection agencies and competition authorities, and we discuss regulatory implications. * An earlier version of this paper has circulated under the title "Data Intermediaries and Selling Mechanisms for Customized Consumer Information". We would like to thank Andreea Cosnita-Langlais, Axel Gautier, Victor Ginsburgh, Doh Shin Jeon, Patrick Legros and Wilfried Sand-Zantman, as well as the participants at the 46th EARIE conference, and the CESifo Area Conference on the Economics of Digitization for useful remarks and comments.

show abstract

Section: Selling Mechanismsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Data Intermediaries and Selling Mechanisms for Customized Consumer Information

2019

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The countervailing incentives to misreport are consequently not present in their model either, rendering their optimal mechanisms always deterministic. Figueroa and Skreta (2009a) and Brocas (2007) analyze optimal auctions with (negative) externalities. Figueroa and Skreta (2009b) study auction design with both positive and negative externalities in a very general setting to identify interesting classes of problems that are solvable via Myerson-like techniques.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal selling mechanisms with countervailing positive externalities and an application to tradable retaliation in the WTO

Chen

Potipiti

2010

Journal of Mathematical Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…The properties of the optimal auction depend in part on the seller's powers to compel potential buyers to participate in the auction. See, e.g., Jehiel and Stacchetti (), Brocas (), and Figueroa and Skreta ().…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

When do auctions ensure the welfare‐maximizing allocation of scarce inputs?

Mayo

Sappington

2016

The RAND J of Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We determine when an unfettered auction will ensure the welfare-maximizing allocation of a scarce input that enhances product quality and may reduce production costs. A supplier values the input for this "use value" and for its "foreclosure value," because once the input is acquired, it is unavailable to rivals. An unfettered auction often ensures the welfare-maximizing allocation of an input increment. However, it can fail to do so when the input would increase relatively rapidly the competitive position of a rival with a moderate competitive disadvantage. Bidder handicapping that ensures auctions generate welfare-maximizing input allocations differ from standard handicapping policies.

show abstract

The role of optimal threats in auction design

Cited by 23 publications

References 11 publications

Data Intermediaries and Selling Mechanisms for Customized Consumer Information

Data Intermediaries and Selling Mechanisms for Customized Consumer Information

Optimal selling mechanisms with countervailing positive externalities and an application to tradable retaliation in the WTO

When do auctions ensure the welfare‐maximizing allocation of scarce inputs?

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About