The Role of Quantitative and Qualitative Network Effects in B2B Platform Competition

Li, Zhiwen; Pénard, Thierry

doi:10.1002/mde.2602

Cited by 20 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 37 publications

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“…The higher the value of δ , the higher the incentive of developers to become complementors, and the more attractive the platform is to users, the more the value of δ increases. Li and Penard () clarified the nature of those indirect network effects. Some of them are quantitative, with agents' choices being governed by a preference for quantity (that is, the number of developers and users on every side of the market).…”

Section: Entry Conditions Into An Established Platform‐dominated Marketmentioning

confidence: 99%

Entrance into a platform‐dominated market: Virtue of an open strategy on the numerical computation market

Blondel

Edouard

2015

Can J Adm Sci

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Strategic and industrial analysis reveals it is extremely difficult to enter a market dominated by an existing platform. In fact, direct or indirect network effects give the established company's platform a considerable competitive edge. This is true of the numerical computation market and the Matlab + Simulink platform by MathWorks. The case study of Scilab Enterprises helps identify conditions of viability for breaking into such a market. We find that alone, the platform strategy is doomed to fail, but accompanied by an open strategy, entering a platform market becomes possible. We hypothesize that a platform strategy is successful when associated with an open innovation process (integration of the open source community) and supported by a business ecosystem (a huge community of developers, users, and allies). Copyright © 2015 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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Section: Entry Conditions Into An Established Platform‐dominated Marketmentioning

confidence: 99%

Entrance into a platform‐dominated market: Virtue of an open strategy on the numerical computation market

Blondel

Edouard

2015

Can J Adm Sci

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“…Plus δ est élevé, plus les développeurs sont incités à devenir complémenteurs, et plus cela rend la plateforme attrayante aux yeux des utilisateurs, plus la valeur de δ augmente. Li et Penard (2014) précisent la nature de ces effets de réseau indirects. Certains sont quantitatifs, les choix des acteurs étant régis par la « préférence pour la quantité » (c'est-à-dire le nombre de développeurs et d'utilisateurs de chaque côté du marché).…”

Section: Les Conditions D'entrée Sur Un Marché Dominé Par Une Platefounclassified

Entrer sur un marché dominé par une plateforme : Vertu d'une stratégie ouverte sur le marché du calcul numérique

Blondel

Edouard

2015

Can J Adm Sci

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Strategic and industrial analysis reveals that it is extremely hard for a new entrant to break into a market dominated by an existing platform. In fact, direct or indirect network effects give the established company's platform a considerable competitive edge. This is true of the numerical computation market and the Matlab + Simulik platform by MathWorks. The case study of Scilab Enterprises helps identify conditions of viability for breaking into such a market. We find that alone, the platform strategy is doomed to fail, but accompanied by an open strategy, entering a platform market becomes possible. We hypothesize that a platform strategy is successful when associated with an open innovation process (integration of the open source community) supported by a business ecosystem (a huge community made up of developers, users, and allies). Copyright © 2015 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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Investigating the mix of strategic choices and performance of transaction platforms: Evidence from the crowdfunding setting

Dushnitsky

Piva

Rossi‐Lamastra

2020

Strategic Management Journal

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The platform literature offers keen insights on the pricing and non-pricing strategies that transaction platforms undertake. We supplement this work by studying how platforms mix together their strategic choices and the association with platforms' performance. To that end, we focus on crowdfunding platforms; a prominent setting of transaction platforms. We present an inductive large-N study of the population of 788 crowdfunding platforms that operated in EU-15 countries up to 2018. Our contribution is threefold: (a) identifying common mixes of strategic choices;(b) tracking deviations from these mixes; and (c) associating these with platforms' survival and growth. We discuss our findings and how they advance knowledge at the intersection of the platform and strategic management literatures. Managerial Summary: Notable transaction-platforms such as eBay, LinkedIn, and Tencent have an aggregate market-value in the hundreds of billions of dollars. We know that platforms' success is driven by the strategic choices they undertake. Yet, we know less about how they mix together these choices and the association with platforms' performance. Our study addresses this gap by focusing on a prominent setting: crowdfunding.

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The Role of Quantitative and Qualitative Network Effects in B2B Platform Competition

Cited by 20 publications

References 37 publications

Entrance into a platform‐dominated market: Virtue of an open strategy on the numerical computation market

Entrance into a platform‐dominated market: Virtue of an open strategy on the numerical computation market

Entrer sur un marché dominé par une plateforme : Vertu d'une stratégie ouverte sur le marché du calcul numérique

Investigating the mix of strategic choices and performance of transaction platforms: Evidence from the crowdfunding setting

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