The Role of the Government in Adaptation to Climate Change

Abstract

Introduction Climate change is a challenge to societies and economies around the globe. Basically, policy makers have two options to react to climate change: they can try to slow down and possibly halt climate change (mitigation), or they can accept the change and let their economies at least partially adapt to it (adaptation). Both strategies involve costs. On the one hand, carbon abatement requires the usage of new and comparatively expensive technologiesöfor example, renewable energy sources. On the other hand, adjustments to the effects of a changing climate require private and public resourcesö for example, the use of air conditioning and the construction of flood protection systems. An optimal global policy should counterbalance mitigation and adaptation, minimising the sum of costs caused by mitigation, adaptation, and residual damages. Of course, this stylised global perspective has its theoretical pitfalls and practical limits. For example, in the real world, as emphasised by Tol (2005), adaptation and mitigation are done by different people operating at different spatial and temporal scales. Contrary to mitigation, adaptation is mostly a local or regional issue. This hampers the theoretically possible trade-off adaptation and mitigation. Therefore, at the national level adaptation policy can be treated as a field of action independent from mitigation policy that is determined on an international level. Although adaptation has been less prominent than mitigation in the public, scientific, and economic debate for many years, this perception has changed in recent years. There are at least two main reasons for this. First, climate change is already observable andögiven the inertia of the climate systemöwill inevitably intensify (EEA, 2008; IPCC, 2007a). In other words, even if the world does not warm more than 2 8C above preindustrial temperatures, a target proposed by the EU (CEU, 2004), adaptation is necessary. Second, owing to the well-known free-rider incentives in international negotiations on climate policy, the prospect for a binding agreement restricting the world's emissions sufficiently to halt climate change are at least uncertain (Helm, 2008).

Local governments in the driving seat? A comparative analysis of public and private responsibilities for adaptation to climate change in European and North-American cities

“…Market failure may lead to a lack of adaptation, counterproductive adaptation (think of the building in flood plains as a result of insurance coverage of house owners), or insufficient adaptation so that considerable climate risks remain. Governments can, for instance, mandate insurance to cover the damages of extreme events; or they can become insurance providers (Aakre & Rübbelke, 2010;Mendelsohn, 2006;Osberghaus et al, 2010). When uncertainty regarding climate change and its impacts on society induces market failure, governments may generate and distribute knowledge on climate impacts as public goods (Aakre & Rübbelke, 2010;Berkhout, 2005;Osberghaus et al, 2010;Stern, 2007), in situations where private actors do not have access to sufficient information on climate risks, impacts and solutions.…”

“…Governments can, for instance, mandate insurance to cover the damages of extreme events; or they can become insurance providers (Aakre & Rübbelke, 2010;Mendelsohn, 2006;Osberghaus et al, 2010). When uncertainty regarding climate change and its impacts on society induces market failure, governments may generate and distribute knowledge on climate impacts as public goods (Aakre & Rübbelke, 2010;Berkhout, 2005;Osberghaus et al, 2010;Stern, 2007), in situations where private actors do not have access to sufficient information on climate risks, impacts and solutions. Another rationale for public responsibility is related to national security: in many countries, the construction and maintenance of dikes and levees and emergency planning are regarded as the responsibility of governments (Aakre & Rübbelke, 2010;Berkhout, 2005;Heltberg, Siegel, & Jorgensen, 2009;Osberghaus et al, 2010).…”

“…When uncertainty regarding climate change and its impacts on society induces market failure, governments may generate and distribute knowledge on climate impacts as public goods (Aakre & Rübbelke, 2010;Berkhout, 2005;Osberghaus et al, 2010;Stern, 2007), in situations where private actors do not have access to sufficient information on climate risks, impacts and solutions. Another rationale for public responsibility is related to national security: in many countries, the construction and maintenance of dikes and levees and emergency planning are regarded as the responsibility of governments (Aakre & Rübbelke, 2010;Berkhout, 2005;Heltberg, Siegel, & Jorgensen, 2009;Osberghaus et al, 2010). Another rationale for public responsibility is fairness, by correcting for the distributional consequences of climate impacts and of adaptation action (Bulkeley, Carmin, Castán Broto, & Edwards, 2013;Marino & Ribot, 2012).…”

“…Hess, Malilay, & Parkinson, 2008). Governments can compensate those groups and localities most affected by and vulnerable to climate impacts or adaptation measures (Berkhout, 2005;Osberghaus et al, 2010;Stern, 2007).…”

“…Public actors, such as for instance urban planners, water managers and health officers, may decide to bear responsibility for adaptation action so that present and future generations are sufficiently protected against climate impacts (e.g. Osberghaus, Dannenberg, & Mennel, 2010;Stern, 2007). At the same time, public actors may overreact and cause inefficiencies, thereby illegitimately consuming public resources.…”